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ABSTRACT 
 
Most papers in empirical finance implicitly or explicitly assume the same price of 
risk, for each priced systematic risk factor, across all risky assets within a given domestic 
market. In doing so, they rely on the assumption that markets are domestically integrated 
and, as such, that the price of risk is determined independently of individual investors 
attitude towards risk. This is true in frictionless markets where investors have complete 
information, homogenous beliefs, and hold the mean-variance efficient combination of 
the market portfolio and a risk-free asset. However, investors might not hold the market 
portfolio because of exogenous reasons. In fact, several recent papers have provided 
evidence that US investors do not, holding instead vastly undiversified portfolios. There 
are two main implications to the above. First, if one group of investors does not hold the 
market portfolio, then the remaining set of investors will also not be able to hold the 
market portfolio and will rationally expect to be compensated for bearing idiosyncratic 
risk. Therefore, idiosyncratic risk will be priced in expected returns. Second, the price of 
risk need not be the same across all assets in which case domestic markets are not 
integrated. 
In the first essay titled “Is Idiosyncratic Volatility Really priced?” I show that the 
positive relation between idiosyncratic volatility (IV) and returns found by Fu (2009) 
only exists for firms that are difficult to arbitrage. The relation between IV and returns is 
strong for small and illiquid stocks, but decreases with size and liquidity and becomes 
vi 
 
non-existent for the largest and most liquid firms. Furthermore, zero-cost portfolios based 
on IV and size do not yield positive returns when conservative trading costs are 
considered. This evidence is consistent with an efficient market, in which arbitragers 
exploit profitable investment opportunities and by doing so they prevent systematic 
mispricing in financial markets. 
In the second essay titled “Are the U.S. Equity Markets Domestically Integrated?” 
I investigate whether the three main U.S. equity markets are domestically integrated by 
comparing the price of commonly used risk factors across the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq. 
I find that the markets have significantly different prices of risks for several risk factors, 
indicating that the markets are segmented. The magnitude of the difference is both 
statistically and economically significant, and is not due to arbitrage constraints or model 
misspecification. Instead, I find evidence consistent with the investor-segmentation 
hypothesis, in which different investors choose to hold different subsets of firms and 
demand different prices of risk among the different groups of securities. I do not find that 
segmentation is restricted to a specific time period. On the contrary, it is present in all 
sub-periods. In contrast to the results regarding the pricing of idiosyncratic volatility, 
these results highlight the value of diversification and suggest that domestic equity 
markets are not fully efficient. 
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IS IDIOSYNCRATIC VOLATILITY REALLY PRICED? 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent literature has found a strong relation between idiosyncratic volatility and 
returns (see, e.g., Malkiel and Xu (2002), Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006), and Fu 
(2009)). The findings have puzzled academics as well as practitioners. If robust, such 
findings would have several important implications. 
First, priced idiosyncratic risk would shake the fundamentals of financial theory, 
in particular asset pricing, which builds on the notion that diversification eliminates non-
systematic risk and, therefore, only systematic risk factors are priced. 
Secondly, such a relation would be inconsistent with efficient markets, in which 
arbitragers and analysts work to eliminate arbitrage opportunities. Inefficient markets 
would put individual investors at a disadvantage (since prices would no longer be 
informative of the underlying value of securities) and potentially increase the value of 
actively managed portfolios. Furthermore, it would suggest that there is an unexploited 
profit (risky-arbitrage) opportunity available for savvy investors, who would spend vast 
resources to try to forecast idiosyncratic volatility in order to take advantage of the 
apparent inefficiency. 
Third, it would imply that markets are not allocationally efficient. If capital is not 
allocated where it has the greatest value, economic growth would be slower, and there 
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would be a need for government intervention in the markets. The main objective of this 
paper is to re-examine the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and returns. 
The appearance of priced idiosyncratic risk can be explained in different ways. 
One of the most common explanations is that idiosyncratic volatility appears priced 
because some pervasive systematic risk factor has been omitted from the model. 
Alternatively, if investors are underdiversified this could make them sensitive to the 
idiosyncratic risk of returns (see, e.g., Levy 1978; Merton 1987; Malkiel and Xu 2002).  
It is a well-known fact that many investors are undiversified. Looking at retail 
investors, Goetzmann and Kumar (2004) find that more than 25% hold a single stock in 
their portfolios. Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) argue that investors need 
approximately 50 stocks in their portfolios to be diversified. Goetzmann and Kumar 
(2004) find that less than 10% of retail investors’ portfolios contain more than 10 stocks. 
This suggests that there could be a positive relation between idiosyncratic volatility and 
returns, and several papers have found such a positive relation. 
Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) find a strong positive link between total stock 
market volatility and returns (contradicting the results by Baillie and DeGennaro (1990)). 
Furthermore, they find that the lagged variance of the market has no predictive power for 
market returns implying that it must be the idiosyncratic component of volatility that 
influences returns. However, Wei and Zhang (2005) and Bali, Cakici, Yan, and Zhang 
(2005) show that these results are driven primarily by data in the 1990’s and that the 
trading strategy used by Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) does not yield positive returns for 
extended samples.  
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In contrast, Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) find that stocks with high 
idiosyncratic volatility have low expected returns, implying that idiosyncratic risk is 
negatively priced. They argue that papers that have found a positive link between returns 
and idiosyncratic volatility have not examined the idiosyncratic volatility at the firm 
level, or have not sorted their portfolios directly based on idiosyncratic risk. Jiang, Xu, 
and Yao (2009) argue that the results found by Ang et al. (2006) appear due to an inverse 
relation between idiosyncratic risk and future earning shocks, and the future earnings 
shocks are related to stock returns. In another paper Ang et al. (2009) find that high past 
idiosyncratic volatility is associated with lower future returns both domestically and 
internationally. Han and Lesmond (2009) counter that Ang et al. (2006) results are 
inflated due to the fact that they do not account for the occurrence of zero returns. 
Furthermore, Bali and Cakici (2008) find that the way idiosyncratic volatility is measured 
impacts the relation between idiosyncratic risk and returns. 
Fu (2009) attempts to resolve these mixed findings. He argues that idiosyncratic 
volatility cannot adequately be described as a random walk process, and that using lagged 
idiosyncratic volatility therefore incorrectly estimates expected idiosyncratic volatility. 
He uses Exponential Generalized Autoregressive Heteroskedacticity (EGARCH) models 
to find the expected idiosyncratic volatility and finds a significant positive relation 
between the estimated conditional idiosyncratic volatilities and expected returns.  
However, in order for idiosyncratic volatility to be priced, it is not sufficient that 
the majority of investors are underdiversified. If a few rational, diversified investors 
exist, that would be enough to ensure efficient pricing of securities due to risky arbitrage 
(Fama (1965)). Hence, in order for idiosyncratic volatility to be priced in efficient 
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markets, it is necessary to have both undiversified investors as well as severe arbitrage 
constraints.  
Several papers suggest that small stocks have higher arbitrage constraints than 
large stocks. Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) find that small stocks tend to have higher 
arbitrage risk and find a highly significant, negative correlation between their measure of 
risk of arbitrage and size. Furthermore, Pontiff (2006) argues that small stocks, due to 
their high transaction costs, are more expensive to arbitrage. This implies that size is a 
good proxy for arbitrage constraints. 
In light of the above, we re-examine the relation between expected idiosyncratic 
volatility and returns while accounting for arbitrage constraints. Specifically, we interact 
measures of idiosyncratic volatility with size and find that the relation between 
idiosyncratic volatility and return is very strong for small firms (the lowest size quartile 
of stocks traded on NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq) between 1963 and 2009. However, the 
relation declines in magnitude and disappears completely for the largest quartile of 
stocks. This suggests that the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and returns only 
exists for firms that are difficult to arbitrage. The results hold both for Fu’s (2009) 
measure of expected volatility as well as for realized volatility. Furthermore, we find that 
zero-cost portfolios based on idiosyncratic volatility only yield high positive abnormal 
returns for stocks that are risky and costly to arbitrage (small stocks). For large stocks, 
such portfolios do not yield significant abnormal returns. In addition, we find that even 
conservative estimates of trading costs make zero-cost portfolios based on idiosyncratic 
volatility unprofitable. These results are consistent with an efficient market in which 
arbitrage constraints prevents arbitragers from pricing some assets efficiently. 
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As mentioned, there are strong reasons to believe that size is a good proxy for the 
risks and costs to arbitrage.  However, in sensitivity tests, we divide the firms into 
quartiles based on liquidity and find very similar results. For the least liquid stocks there 
is a strong, positive relation between expected idiosyncratic volatility and returns, but this 
relation disappears completely (becomes insignificant) for the most liquid firms in the 
sample.  
This paper contributes to the literature, on the pricing of idiosyncratic volatility in 
several ways. First, it adds to the literature that argues that idiosyncratic volatility appears 
to be positively related to returns by explicitly considering arbitrage constraints, one of 
the factors that give rise to the appearance that idiosyncratic risk is priced. Accounting 
for arbitrage, we find that such a relation is driven by stocks that are difficult to arbitrage 
and is non-existent for the largest, most frequently traded stocks. Secondly, our results 
suggest that sample selection influences the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and 
returns and, as such, might help to explain the mixed results in the literature. In addition, 
it suggests that the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and returns that has been 
found is consistent with efficient markets.  
The reminder of the essay is organized as follows. Section two discusses the data 
and method of estimating the idiosyncratic volatility measures that are used in the paper. 
In Section three, we present and discuss the results. Section four investigates potentially 
different explanations and provides robustness tests. Finally, Section five concludes.  
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2. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
To conduct the various tests, four sets of data are required.  The first set contains 
the test asset, returns. The second set contains the systematic risk factors that have been 
shown to impact the cross-section of returns. The third set contains measures of 
idiosyncratic volatility, and the forth includes proxies for the difficulties to arbitrage. 
The data are obtained from three sources. Daily and monthly individual security 
data for all firms traded on NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq from 1963 to 2009 is obtained 
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We obtain data on stock returns 
(RET), prices (P), shares outstanding (SHROUT), volume (VOL) and bid-ask spreads 
(SPREAD). We also obtain value weighted index returns from CRSP. Accounting data, 
or more specifically book values, are obtained from Compustats annual fundamentals 
file. The Fama and French (1993) factors, Small-Minus-Big (SMB) and High-Minus-Low 
(HML), as well as the market premium and the proxy for the risk-free rate are obtained 
through Kenneth French’s webpage1.  
A. Test asset 
The test assets used in this paper are individual stock returns for all firms traded 
on the three major US exchanges. Monthly holding period returns are obtained through 
CRSP. Following conventions in the literature (Fu (2009)) on predicting idiosyncratic 
volatility, we exclude returns in excess of 300%. Holding period returns (RET) include 
capital gains as well as dividend yields. 
                                                          
1
 We thank Kenneth French for making the data available. 
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B. Systematic risk factors 
Fama and French (1992) show in their seminal paper that size and book-to-market 
ratio are able to explain the cross-section of stock returns. In this paper, we estimate beta, 
size, and book-to-market ratio as in Fama and French (1992) for each of our securities. 
Beta, size, and book-to-market are calculated in June every year, and used from July in 
that year until June in the following year. 
To calculate market beta (BETA), monthly stock returns over the previous 60 
months are regressed on the CRSP value weighted index return to estimate individual 
firm betas. We then create 10 size portfolios based on market capitalization in June for 
stocks traded on NYSE. For each size decile, we form 10 beta portfolios based on the 
estimated betas for the individual firms. The procedure rolls forward every year.  
For each of the 100 size- portfolios, we calculate the equally weighted portfolio 
return every month and regress the monthly portfolio returns on the current and lagged 
(one period) value weighted market index. The final portfolio beta is computed by 
summing the two slopes (the coefficient on the contemporaneous and lagged value 
weighted market index return). Finally, we allocate the beta of a size- portfolio to each 
stock that was included in that portfolio in each month. Summing the slopes is suggested 
by Dimson (1979) to adjust for non-synchronous trading.  
Size (ME) is measured by the market value of equity (shares outstanding 
multiplied by price in June every year). BE/ME is the book-to-market ratio, calculated 
using December (t-1) market value of equity and the book value of equity for the fiscal 
year that ended in year t-1. The time lag used is to ensure that the information was 
available to investors at the time it is used in the analysis. 
8 
 
Since Fama and French developed their factors in 1992, much research has been 
focused on explaining cross-sectional returns. Liquidity and momentum are two of the 
most frequently used variables that have been shown to impact cross-sectional returns. 
Similarly, since Amihud and Mendelson (1986) introduced liquidity as a factor, several 
papers have since shown that it is important in the cross-section of returns (see, e.g., 
Brennan and Subrahmanyam 1996; Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe 1998; Chorida, 
Subrahmanyam and Anshuman 2001; Amihud 2002; Pastor and Stambaugh 2003). 
Jagadeesh and Titman (1993) show that a momentum effect is present in stock price 
movements and Jagadeesh and Titman (2001) find that the effect has remained significant 
long after it was discovered. Therefore, we augment the Fama and French (1992) three-
factor model with proxies of these factors. 
We measure momentum and liquidity as in Chordia, Subrahmanyam and 
Anshuman (2001). The measure of momentum, RET (-2,-7) is calculated as the average 
holding period return between month t-7 to t-2. We exclude the last month’s (t-1) return 
to avoid returns merely due to bid-ask bounce. For liquidity, we use two different 
measures. Turnover (TURN) is calculated as the average monthly share turnover in the 
past 36 months. Monthly share turnover is calculated as the monthly volume divided by 
the number of shares outstanding. The second measure of liquidity, CVTURN, is the 
coefficient of variation of those turnovers over the same 36 months. As can be seen in the 
variable definitions, all systematic risk factors are estimated using data up until t-1 and 
are therefore predetermined at time t. 
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C. Idiosyncratic volatility 
In order to investigate the relation between returns and idiosyncratic volatility, we 
must first have a good measure of idiosyncratic volatility. Many previous papers looked 
at the relation between returns and lagged idiosyncratic volatility as a proxy for expected 
idiosyncratic volatility, implicitly assuming that idiosyncratic volatility follows a random 
walk (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006)). However, Fu (2009) points out that this is 
problematic. He rejects the null hypothesis of a random walk for the idiosyncratic 
volatility for 90% of the firms in his sample and argues that forecasting using models in 
the GARCH family would do better in estimating future volatility. Particularly, he 
suggests that the EGARCH model proposed by Nelson (1991) would provide a superior 
model of expected idiosyncratic volatility since it captures the asymmetric properties of 
volatility (Dennis, Mayhew, and Stivers (2006) show the importance of asymmetric 
volatility effects and investigate the effect further by explicitly distinguishing between 
surprises in systematic and idiosyncratic volatility). The EGARCH models are also more 
flexible than other ARCH and GARCH models and do not restrict the parameters to 
avoid negative values.  
Guo, Ferguson, and Kassa (2010) criticize the expected idiosyncratic volatility 
measure used by Fu (2009), for being estimated in a way that introduces a look-ahead 
bias. Fu (2010) re-estimate his model with completely out-of-sample data and reinforces 
the strong positive relation between idiosyncratic volatility and returns. He further finds 
that the measure of expected idiosyncratic volatility is qualitatively insensitive to the bias 
suggested by Guo, Ferguson, and Kassa (2010).  
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We measure idiosyncratic volatility in two ways. The first (main) measure of 
idiosyncratic volatility is the expected idiosyncratic volatility (E(IVOL)) obtained from 
EGARCH models (Nelson (1991)). Pagan and Schwert (1990) compare different 
GARCH models and they find that the EGARCH model does the best in explaining 
monthly return volatility. Explicitly, the EGARCH model that we fit is: 
 ,   	  
+ ,  , + SMB+ HML + ,,  ,~N0, σ, ! (1) 
  
ln σ, 	   
 $ % b,' ln σ,(' 
)
'*+
$ , c,. /θ /ε,(.σ,(.2 $ Υ /4
ε,(.σ,(.4   
26 +/ 2 2
8
9*+
 
(2) 
Following Fu (2009) we estimate all possible EGARCH (p,q) models in which 
1 ; < ; 3 and 1 ; > ; 3 for a total of 9 possible models per firm and month. Thus, each 
EGARCH model has p+q+3 parameters. The goal with this is to estimate the conditional 
variance ?  at time t. We use the best fitting, according to the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC), converging model for each firm and month. French, Schwert, and 
Stambaugh (1987), as well as Fu (2009), find that using time-varying parameters do not 
change their results. However, estimating the model during the entire sample period does 
induce a look-ahead-bias. We therefore estimate the EGARCH models using expanding 
windows. We require a minimum of 30 months of prior return data in order to estimate 
the expected idiosyncratic volatility for the following month.2 The conditional 
idiosyncratic volatility, denoted E(IVOL) will be used in the cross-sectional tests as the 
expected idiosyncratic volatility.  
                                                          
2
 Consistent with French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987), as well as Fu (2009), we get qualitatively 
similar results when estimating the parameters using the entire time period. 
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The second measure of idiosyncratic volatility is the realized idiosyncratic 
volatility (IVOL). In order to obtain this, we regress daily stock returns (for each 
individual security) on the daily Fama and French (1993) factors in every month. Han 
and Lesmond (2009) raise the concern that infrequent trading drive parts of the 
idiosyncratic volatility effect. In order to mitigate this issue we require that, in a given 
month, a stock has at least 15 observations of non-zero trading volume to be eligible for 
estimation. 
For each security, in each month, we estimate the realized idiosyncratic volatility using 
the following time series regression: 
 ,   	  
,+ ,,   + ,SMB+ ,HML + , (3) 
, is the return (in percent) on security i on day t.  is the proxy for the risk-free rate 
of return. b, s, and h are factor sensitivities to each of the Fama and French (1993) 
factors. We calculate IVOL, for a given month, as the standard deviation of the daily 
residuals from the within-month regression. Monthly idiosyncratic volatilities are 
calculated by multiplying the daily standard deviation of the residuals by the square root 
of the number of trading days in that month. 
D. Proxies for the difficulties to arbitrage 
The main idea in this paper is that if markets are efficient, idiosyncratic volatility 
should not be related to returns for those firms that are easy to arbitrage. As a proxy for 
arbitrage costs, we use firm size (ME). Although many proxies have been used in the 
literature, size is highly correlated with all proxies. Several papers suggest that small 
stocks have higher arbitrage risk than large stocks. Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) find 
12 
 
that small stocks tend to have higher arbitrage risk and find a very highly significant 
negative correlation between their measure of risk of arbitrage and size. Furthermore, 
Pontiff (2006) argues that small stocks, due to their high transaction costs, are more 
expensive to arbitrage. This implies that size is a good proxy for the difficulty to 
arbitrage. Another proxy for difficulties to arbitrage is liquidity. Less liquid firms are 
risker to arbitrage due to their higher trading costs, and we would therefore expect the 
relation between idiosyncratic risk and returns to be more pronounced for firms with low 
liquidity.  
Due to limitations in accounting data prior to July of 1963, we have limited the 
sample period to be between July of 1963 and December of 2009. This results in 
3,177,998 firm-month observations over the 558 month sample window. All variables, 
except for returns and beta, are winsorized at the .5% and 99.5% in order to avoid giving 
extreme observations heavy weight. Variables that have skewness greater than 3 are 
transformed into their natural logarithm. 
E. Summary statistics  
Table 1.1 reports the summary statistics for the complete sample consisting of 
more than three million firm-month observations. The summary statistics are very close 
to those presented in Fu (2009), even though the sample used in his paper has been 
extended by three years to December 2009. The arithmetic mean monthly return is 
1.08%, and the mean excess monthly return is .64%. The arithmetic mean realized 
idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) is 12.57% while the mean expected idiosyncratic 
volatility (E(IVOL)) is 11.56%. Both measures of idiosyncratic volatility have a large 
spread, with standard deviations in excess of 70% of their arithmetic means. The average 
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arithmetic beta for the firm-months is 1.27. The interaction term E(IVOL)×LN(ME) has a 
mean of 21.94 and a standard deviation of 27.34. The high variation in both the 
idiosyncratic volatility measures, as well as the interaction term implies that the data is 
rich in variability, and could do a good job of explaining the variation in the cross-
sectional returns. 
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3. RESULTS 
In this section we analyze the data and present the major results of the paper. We 
start out by looking at univariate results in Section 3.A. This analysis is followed by a 
more thorough analysis using cross-sectional regressions in Section 3.B.  Finally we 
investigate portfolio strategies based on expected idiosyncratic volatility and size in 
Section 3.C 
A. Univariate tests 
Table 1.2 presents the time-series means of the simple cross-sectional Pearson 
correlation coefficients. In every month we obtain the contemporaneous Pearson 
correlation coefficients between each pair of variables using the cross-section of stocks. 
The reported correlation coefficients are the average over the sample period of 558 
months. Correlation coefficients that are significant at 1%, given their time-series 
standard error, are marked with two asterisks (**). As would be expected, and in 
accordance with Fama and French (1992) as well as Fu (2009), book-to-market has a 
positive correlation with returns while the relation between returns and beta is 
insignificant. Furthermore, size is negatively correlated with returns, even though the 
relation is statistically insignificant in our sample. 
Consistent with Fu (2009), we find a significant positive correlation between 
measures of idiosyncratic volatility (both realized and expected) and returns. In sharp 
contrast the interaction terms E(IVOL)×LN(ME) and IVOL×LN(ME) are both negatively 
correlated with returns. Interestingly, we also find that returns and liquidity are negatively 
correlated. Given that these variables are proxies for arbitrage they suggest that Fu’s 
(2009) results might not be robust. All other correlation coefficients are as expected, and 
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congruent with what has been shown in previous literature. Returns are positively 
correlated with past returns, indicating the presence of a momentum effect. None of the 
correlation coefficients are large enough to give rise to a concern about multicollinearity 
in the regressions to follow. 
B. Cross-sectional regressions with Fama-MacBeth (1973) T-stats 
The preliminary evidence from the correlation analysis implies that when we 
account for arbitrage constraints, the positive relation between returns and idiosyncratic 
volatility is not robust. In this section, we take a more rigorous look at the issue.  We 
follow the methodology of Fama and MacBeth (1973) and run cross-sectional regressions 
in every month from July of 1963 to December of 2009, a total of 558 months. The 
dependent variable in the monthly regressions is the holding period return on all firms in 
our sample that have information on all explanatory variables in that month. The 
explanatory variables are as defined in Section 2. Note, as stated in the variable 
definitions, that all the explanatory variables (except for realized idiosyncratic volatility) 
are predetermined at time t with respect to the return on firm i, ,. 
More explicitly, for every month, we estimate a model that is nested in the 
following cross- sectional regression, 
 R, 	 
 $ +ABCD, $   EFGB, $ HEF IJKKL, $ MBNOPE, $
QBC7, 2, $ SEFCTF, $ UEFVOCTF, $ WBNOPE X
EFGB, $ , , 
(4) 
where R, is the gross return on security i in month t. The explanatory variables are 
described in Section 2. The variables of interest are E(IVOL) and E(IVOL)×LN(ME). 
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E(IVOL) is the expected idiosyncratic volatility in the month obtained from EGARCH 
models, and E(IVOL)×LN(ME) represents the interaction term between the expected 
idiosyncratic volatility and size. If the appearance of priced idiosyncratic volatility is due 
to costly arbitrage, we would expect that including the interaction term decreases the 
effect, since larger firms would be easier to arbitrage. 
The coefficients reported are the mean coefficients from the above regression 
estimated from July of 1963 until December of 2009, for a total of 558 months. Similarly, 
the reported R-squared is the average R-squared from the monthly regressions.  The 
number of securities included, i, varies every month. We calculate time series standard 
errors using the estimator in Newey and West (1987) with three lags. 
The test-statistics reported in Table 1.3 are the mean slopes  9YYY divided by their 
time series standard error. We first replicate the main findings of Fama and French 
(1992) in our extended sample and find that size (ME) and book-to-market (BE/ME) help 
to explain the cross-sectional variation in returns (Model 1). As shown by Fama and 
French (1992), size is negatively related to returns, while book-to-market is positively 
related to returns in the cross-section. We also find, in accordance with Fama and French 
(1992), that the relation between return and market beta is flat (insignificant test statistic).  
Since Fama and French developed their factors in 1992, much research has been 
focused on explaining cross-sectional returns. Liquidity and momentum are two of the 
most frequently used variables that have been shown to impact cross-sectional returns. 
Adding these variables (measured as described in Section 2.B) to the model is important 
since it decreases the chance that a relation between idiosyncratic volatility and return 
would simply be the result of idiosyncratic volatility being a proxy for some omitted, 
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priced factor. Adding liquidity and momentum to the cross-sectional regressions (Model 
2) increases the proportion of explained variation in returns, but does not alter the signs 
of any of the coefficients, congruent with prior literature. As expected, the relation 
between liquidity (TURN and CVTURN) and return is negative while the relation 
between momentum (RET -7, -2) and return in positive. 
In Models 3 and 4, we replicate the main finding of Fu (2009) and find that 
expected idiosyncratic volatility, as estimated by the EGARCH model, is an influential 
determinant in the cross-section of returns. Like Fu (2009) we find that the sign of the 
relation is positive, so that higher expected idiosyncratic volatility is associated with 
higher returns. The coefficients on the measure of expected idiosyncratic volatility are 
statistically significant and large in magnitude. Further, the explanatory power of 
idiosyncratic volatility remains after controlling for momentum and liquidity (Model 4). 
Like Fu, we find that adding idiosyncratic volatility to the test changes the sign of the 
size coefficient. This implies that the negative relation between size and returns found 
when omitting IV is due to omitted factors that affect small firms adversely. After 
including such a factor, expected idiosyncratic volatility, the relation between size and 
returns is positive. This is consistent with Merton (1987) who suggests that, all else 
equal, large firms should be outperforming small firms. 
The main interest in the cross-sectional regression are the results from models 5 
and 6, and particularly the coefficient on the interaction term between size and expected 
idiosyncratic volatility (E(IVOL)×LN(ME)). We find that the interaction term is negative 
and significantly different from zero. This implies that the relation between returns and 
idiosyncratic volatility decreases with size. The coefficient remains strongly significant 
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and economically meaningful in all model specifications. In regressions 7 and 8 we 
substitute realized idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) for E(IVOL) in Equation 4, and show 
that the relation also holds for realized idiosyncratic volatility.  
With the interaction term the coefficients on E(IVOL) can no longer be 
interpreted as their stand-alone figures, but need to be interpreted at a certain level of the 
variable with which it is interacted (LN(ME)). This gives the “net effect” of E(IVOL) 
given a certain level of size. We analyze the net effect of E(IVOL) on returns at the 
average size (LN(ME)): 
 
Z[,\ZK]^_` 	  M\a $ W\ a b EFGBc,YYYYYYYYYYYYY. (5) 
Table 1.4 illustrates the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and return for firms in 
four size quartiles based on NYSE breakpoints. As is clearly evident, the relation 
between idiosyncratic volatility and return decreases as size increases. For the smallest 
NYSE quartile of firms (quartile 1), the models suggest that the net effect of idiosyncratic 
volatility on returns is about twice as large as for the 2rd NYSE quartile, and about 2-4 
times larger than when compared to the 3rd quartile. More interesting, the net impact of 
idiosyncratic volatility on returns approaches zero for firms in the largest NYSE quartile 
(slightly negative in Model 5 and slightly positive in Model 6). Since the natural 
logarithm of size (LN(ME)) has been used in the interaction term in the model 
specification, this suggests that the relation between expected idiosyncratic volatility and 
returns decreases logarithmically with size. However, the relation could take other forms. 
In the robustness Section 4.A, we allow for the relation between idiosyncratic volatility 
and returns to depend on difficulties to arbitrage in other ways by re-estimating the cross-
sectional regressions for different size quartiles. 
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Given that size is a good proxy for costs of arbitrage, this lends strong support to 
the idea discussed in the introduction to this paper, that idiosyncratic volatility is not 
priced for firms that are easy to arbitrage. This further implies that the relation between 
idiosyncratic volatility and returns can differ for different samples. Samples that are 
dominated by firms that have low arbitrage costs such as large firms, firms that are well 
covered in the media, or firms that have a substantial amount of accounting data 
available, would be likely to display a weaker relation between returns and E(IVOL) than 
those samples comprised of all stocks. This can explain why several previous authors 
have found conflicting results on the relation between returns and idiosyncratic volatility. 
Furthermore, this is an important consideration when researching idiosyncratic volatility 
internationally. Selection biases in data availability internationally could greatly influence 
any inferences on the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and returns. 
C. Portfolios formed on size and expected idiosyncratic volatility 
The previous results indicate that the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and 
returns depends on arbitrage constraints, as proxied by size. We therefore form portfolios 
based on size and expected idiosyncratic volatility and re-examine this relation. The 
advantage of the portfolio approach is that it allows for easily interpreted returns on 
feasible investment portfolios.  
Every year we sort the stocks on size and assign them into five size portfolios. 
Each month, we sort the stocks in each size portfolio on their expected idiosyncratic 
volatility for the following month and then assign them into five portfolios. Hence, each 
month we have 25 portfolios based on size and expected idiosyncratic volatility. We then 
compute the value weighted monthly time-series returns for each portfolio. If stocks that 
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have high expected idiosyncratic volatility outperform those that do not, then zero-cost 
portfolios formed by purchasing the portfolio with highest idiosyncratic volatility and 
shorting the portfolio with lowest idiosyncratic volatility should yield positive returns. Fu 
(2009) finds that this is the case. In this paper we examine if such a strategy is profitable 
only for small firms by using the double-sorted portfolios. The results are presented in 
Panel A of Table 1.5. We find that the zero-cost portfolio returns for portfolios of small 
sized stocks are very large, but approach zero for large stocks. This strongly supports the 
idea that there is no relation between idiosyncratic volatility and returns for large stocks. 
Large stocks are easy to arbitrage, and even if underdiversified retail investors hold these 
stocks, any non-systematic risk premium would quickly disappear through arbitrage. 
Furthermore, regressing the portfolio’s returns on the Fama-French (1993) three 
factors also yield high positive Jensen (1968) alphas for the small stock/high 
idiosyncratic volatility portfolios (Table 1.5, Panel B). For the large stock and high 
expected idiosyncratic volatility portfolios the alphas are statistically insignificant and 
economically small. This lends further support to the idea that any relation between 
idiosyncratic volatility and return is limited to stocks which are difficult to arbitrage. A 
closer look at the table shows that the portfolio alphas are negative for all small stock 
portfolios, except for those in the highest quintile of idiosyncratic volatility. Hence, not 
only is the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and returns limited to small firms, but 
also the portfolio alphas imply that the relation is limited to those stocks in the highest 
quintile of idiosyncratic volatility. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that trading costs are not considered for 
these portfolios. Since trading costs are much higher (as a percentage) for small stocks 
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with high idiosyncratic volatility (Kelly (2005)), it would be interesting to look at a 
trading strategy including trading costs. Unfortunately, there are no bid-ask spreads 
available for most of the stocks used in the sample in this paper. However, CRSP 
provides bid-ask spreads for stocks traded on Nasdaq. Limiting the sample to stocks 
traded on Nasdaq with non-missing values of the bid-ask spread yields a subsample of 
511,485 firm-month observations. Every year we divide those stocks into 4 portfolios 
based on size and for each size quartile, we break them up in four expected idiosyncratic 
volatility quartiles (monthly). We then look at the average returns for each of the 16 
(4×4) portfolios and find very similar results to those in the complete sample (Table 1.6, 
Panel A). Every month a stock appears in a portfolio which it was not prior included in 
we calculate the (one-way) trading cost as the bid-ask spread divided by two times the 
stock price, and add that cost to the new portfolio that the stock is included in (hence, we 
do not account for a cost at the time of the sale). This is a very conservative measure of 
trading costs, considering it only takes into account purchasing costs and not selling 
costs. Furthermore, it ignores any brokerage costs that would be charged. The results, 
presented in Panel B of table 1.6 indicate that the ME-E(IVOL) double-sorted portfolios 
do not yield substantial positive returns. The value weighted return for the portfolio with 
the smallest stocks and the highest idiosyncratic volatility actually becomes negative. We 
are aware that an unlimited number of potential portfolios could be formed and that the 
results given the 4×4 portfolios3 is not exclusive evidence that it is impossible to form 
profitable portfolios based on size and idiosyncratic volatility. Trading strategies using 
2×2 and 3×3 portfolios were also tested, with very similar results (not reported, but 
                                                          
3
 Due to very high variability in expected idiosyncratic volatility over time, approximately 55% of stocks 
are traded (change portfolios) in a given month using 4×4 portfolios. When using fewer portfolios, the 
proportion of stock traded every months decrease, but the qualitative results remain.  
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available from the authors on request). However, considering the extremely conservative 
measure used for trading costs here, and the negative returns yielded by the portfolios, it 
seems like it would be difficult for such trading strategies to be beneficial.  These results 
imply that it is difficult, if not impossible, for diversified investors to benefit from the 
positive relation between idiosyncratic volatility and returns by short term trading. This is 
consistent with an efficient market.  
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4. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
In this section we perform three robustness tests. Section 4.A provides tests that 
allow for size to have an effect on the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and returns 
that is not linear. In Section 4.B we show that the findings in this paper, that the relation 
between idiosyncratic volatility and returns depend on difficulties to arbitrage is robust to 
another measure of the difficulties to arbitrage. Finally, in Section 4.C we show that the 
results are robust to the choice of time frame for the analysis. 
A. Sample broken down by size quartiles 
One argument that could be made against the previous tests, especially those in 
Table 1.3, is that the variation in idiosyncratic volatility for large firms is not sufficient to 
give power to these tests. Table 1.7 shows summary statistics broken up by size quartiles 
formed based on NYSE stock breakpoints over the period from 1963 to 2009. NYSE 
breakpoints are used in order to avoid small firms dominating after the inclusion of 
Nasdaq stocks in 1973 (for more on this issue, see Fama and French (1992)).  
The mean expected idiosyncratic volatility decreases monotonically over the size 
quartiles, confirming the negative correlation between size and idiosyncratic volatility 
shown in Table 1.2. However, of primary interest is not the mean, but the standard 
deviation of the variables across the size quartiles. As the evidence in the table indicates, 
the standard deviations of E(IVOL) is large across all the size quartiles (greater than 4). 
This should be more than sufficient to generate reliable coefficients and test statistics for 
the cross-sectional regressions. Furthermore, and of equal interest, is the standard 
deviation of the interaction term (E(IVOL)×LN(ME)). The standard deviation is very 
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uniform across the size quartiles, lending further support to the validity of the coefficients 
produced by the cross-sectional regressions.   
As mentioned in Section 3.B, the previous cross-sectional regressions suggest that 
the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and returns decreases logarithmically with 
size. However, this does not have to be the case. To further test the validity of the results 
presented above, we re-estimate Models 6 and 8 from Table 1.3 for each size quartile. 
The results from the regressions are presented in Table 1.8, and the net E(IVOL) effect is 
the net effect of E(IVOL) evaluated at the mean size for each size quartile. 
Once again, it is important not to focus too much on the significance of the 
idiosyncratic volatility measure alone, since it has to be interpreted in combination with 
the interaction term. Looking at the net effect, we see that the relation between both 
E(IVOL) and returns (Panel A) and IVOL and returns (Panel B) decrease monotonically 
across the size quartiles and reaches 0 for the largest quartiles4.  
In addition, liquidity (as measured by Turnover) appears to have a much stronger 
explanatory power for returns among small firms. While liquidity appears to have a 
strong influence on returns among small firms (both statistically and economically 
significant), it becomes insignificant and economically small for large firms. These 
results support and add to the evidence that the relation between idiosyncratic volatility 
and returns is limited to small firms which are difficult to arbitrage. 
                                                          
4
 Even though the interaction term is insignificant in two of the specifications, it has been included for 
consistency. We have also estimated the regressions without the interaction term (LN(ME)×E(IVOL)) with 
the same qualitative results.  
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B. Different measures of the risk and costs of arbitrage 
Yet another argument that could be raised against the above results, in particular 
against the finding of an insignificant relation between idiosyncratic volatility and returns 
for large firms, is that the relations using size as a proxy for difficulties to arbitrage do 
not hold for other proxies for difficulties to arbitrage. Here, we use liquidity as an 
alternative measure for difficulties to arbitrage. We divide the sample into four quartiles 
based on liquidity, as represented by turnover, and re-estimate the cross-sectional 
regressions for each of the liquidity quartiles. The results are presented in Table 1.9. We 
find that the same results that hold when sorting on size also holds when sorting into 
liquidity quartiles. For the least liquid stocks, the relation between expected idiosyncratic 
volatility and returns is very strong (both statistically and economically significant), but it 
decreases in magnitude over the liquidity quartiles. For the quartile of stocks that are 
most liquid, the relation between expected idiosyncratic volatility and returns disappear 
completely (it becomes statistically insignificant).5  
C. Relation between idiosyncratic volatility and return over time 
It has been argued that relations such as those found here are sensitive to the 
sample period (Wei and Zhang (2005)). We, therefore, split the sample into three sub-
periods, 1963-1978, 1979-1994, and 1995-2009, and re-estimate model 6 from Table 1.3 
for each sub-period. The results are reported in Table 1.10. We find that the inferences 
from above are insensitive to the time period used. In fact, the effect of E(IVOL) on 
                                                          
5
 As seen in table 9, we include an interaction term between our liquidity measure and idiosyncratic 
volatility, to be consistent with previous tests where we included interaction between size and idiosyncratic 
volatility. Considering that the interaction terms are insignificant in all the model specification, we re-
estimate the regressions without the interaction terms and obtain identical inferences regarding the effect of 
E(IVOL). The coefficient on E(IVOL) is negative and insignificant for the quartile of firms that are most 
liquid. For the remaining quartiles, the coefficients on E(IVOL) are positive and significant, but decrease 
with liquidity. 
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returns as well as the effect of E(IVOL)×LN(ME) remains highly statistically and 
economically significant in all sub-period. The results also hold for other choices of sub-
periods (not reported).  
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5. CONCLUSION 
Many investors seem to hold undiversified portfolios. However, in an efficient 
market, this would not be sufficient to induce a relation between idiosyncratic volatility 
and returns. Instead, in an efficient market, diversified traders would take advantage of 
the opportunity and eliminate such a relation. However, if the market is efficient, but 
arbitraging is difficult or costly, this could prevent diversified traders from trading in 
certain assets, allowing a relation to emerge between idiosyncratic volatility and returns. 
This paper shows this to be the case. Specifically, we find that firms that are easy to 
arbitrage (such as large firms and liquid firms) exhibit no relation between idiosyncratic 
volatility and returns. The result is robust when we use different approaches to examine 
the relation, when we use alternate proxies for idiosyncratic volatility, and when we 
estimate the relation over different time periods. 
 The tests and evidence in this paper reconcile, at least in part, the opposing 
findings of the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and returns that currently exist in 
this fast growing literature on idiosyncratic volatility. We show that a positive (or 
negative) relation does not exist for all securities, but depend on the cost and risk 
associated with arbitrage for each security. Hence, the relation depends partly on the 
sample. Only investigating large stocks shows a much weaker relation than only 
investigating small stocks. Since previous papers look at different samples, this can help 
to clarify why researchers have found conflicting evidence on the relation between 
idiosyncratic volatility and returns. Finally, the findings in this paper are consistent with 
efficient markets.  
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics 
 
Table 1.1 shows descriptive statistics for the pooled sample. RET is the average monthly holding period 
return. RET-RF is the average holding period return minus the proxy for the risk-free rate. BETA is the 
average firm/month beta estimated as in Fama and French (1992). ME is market equity updated in June of 
every year (t) and used from July in that year (t) until June the following year (t+1). BE/ME is book-to-
market ratio estimated as in Fama and French (1992); the fiscal year end book value (t-1) is divided by the 
calendar year end (t-1) market equity. A firm’s BE/ME is assigned to the firm from July in the year after it 
was estimated (t), until June (t+1) of the following year in order to ensure that it was available to investors 
at the time it is used to predict returns. RET(-2,-7) is the average stock return from month t-7 to t-2. TURN 
is the average turnover over the last 36 months (eg. T-37 to T-1). CVTURN is the coefficient of variation 
of the turnover over the last 36 months (eg. T-37 to T-1). E(IVOL) is the idiosyncratic volatility estimate 
generated by EGARCH(p,q) models where 1<p<3 and 1<q<3. IVOL is the realized idiosyncratic volatility. 
All variables except for RET, RET-RF and BETA have been winsorized at the .5% level. Observations 
with returns exceeding 300% have been excluded, and variables with skewness greater than 3 are presented 
as their natural logarithm. 
 
Variable Mean Median Std dev. Q1 Q3 Skewness N 
RET (%) 1.08 0.00 17.00 -6.45 6.85 2.40 3177998 
RET-RF (%) 0.64 -0.42 17.01 -6.90 6.42 2.40 3177998 
BETA 1.27 1.24 0.36 0.98 1.50 0.19 2462043 
LN(ME) 2.10 1.97 2.08 0.59 3.49 0.32 3034560 
LN(BEME) -0.41 -0.39 1.09 -1.02 0.18 0.50 1918200 
RET(-2,-7) 1.06 0.41 6.87 -2.59 3.49 2.70 2982871 
LN(TURN) 1.46 1.46 1.12 0.72 2.22 -0.11 2215612 
LN(CVTURN) 4.13 4.13 0.47 3.82 4.43 0.16 2212543 
LN(AMILL) -1.30 -1.05 3.05 -3.40 0.98 -0.30 2609138 
E(IVOL) 11.56 9.36 8.40 6.27 14.19 2.65 2196801 
IVOL 12.57 9.49 10.77 5.80 15.65 2.72 2873083 
E(IVOL)×LN(ME) 21.94 18.47 27.34 6.65 33.68 1.40 2190425 
IVOL×LN(ME) 22.16 18.28 28.27 7.36 32.47 1.88 2731531 
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Table 1.2: Cross-sectional correlations 
 
 RET(%) RET 
-RF(%) 
BETA LN(ME) LN 
(B/M) 
RET 
(-2,-7) 
LN 
(TURN) 
LN 
(CVTURN) 
E(IVOL) IVOL E(IVOL)× 
LN(ME) 
RET-RF(%) 1.00**           
BETA -0.01 0.01          
LN(ME) -0.01 -0.01 -0.28**         
LN(B/M) 0.03** 0.03** -0.07** -0.25**        
RET(-2,-7) 0.02** 0.02** -0.03** 0.04** 0.06**       
LN(TURN) -0.02** -0.02** 0.42** 0.06** -0.11** 0.00      
LN(CVTURN) 0.00 0.00 0.21** -0.57** 0.18** 0.05** 0.01     
E(IVOL) 0.11** 0.11** 0.37** -0.37** -0.07** -0.03** 0.24** 0.33**    
IVOL 0.12** 0.12** 0.35** -0.43** -0.05** -0.13** 0.19** 0.36** 0.54**   
E(IVOL)× 
LN(ME) -0.02** -0.02** -0.01 0.72** -0.33** 0.01** 0.24** -0.32** 0.01 -0.21**  
IVOL×LN(ME) -0.03** -0.03** -0.02** 0.65** -0.26** -0.03** 0.14** -0.25** -0.11** -0.05** 0.75** 
This table displays the time-series means of the cross-sectional Pearson correlation coefficients. In every month we obtain the contemporaneous Pearson 
correlation coefficients between each pair of variables using the cross-section of stocks. The reported correlation coefficients are the average over the sample 
period of 558 months. Correlation coefficients that are significant at 1%, given their time-series standard error, are marked with two asterisks **. The coefficients 
relate to a sample of stocks traded NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq between July 1963 and December 2009.  
 
 
33 
 
Table 1.3: Cross-sectional regressions with Fama-MacBeth T-stats 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
BETA 0.10 (0.41) 
0.23 
(1.28)       
LN(ME) -0.13 (-3.15) 
-0.18 
(-4.54) 
0.34 
(9.78) 
0.22 
(5.98) 
0.93 
(20.31) 
0.71 
(15.16) 
0.99 
(20.87) 
0.68 
(15.37) 
LN(BE/ME) 0.21 (3.88) 
0.16 
(3.24) 
0.63 
(11.69) 
0.51 
(10.55) 
0.53 
(10.27) 
0.44 
(9.40) 
0.59 
(10.98) 
0.42 
(8.80) 
E(IVOL)   0.27 (15.97) 
0.29 
(18.57) 
0.34 
(19.25) 
0.34 
(19.73)   
IVOL       0.39 (15.66) 
0.40 
(15.98) 
RET(-7,-2)  0.03 (2.40)  
0.05 
(4.60)  
0.05 
(4.54)  
0.10 
(8.72) 
LN(TURN)  -0.15 (-2.60)  
-0.58 
(-9.12)  
-0.41 
(-6.77)  
-0.57 
(-9.32) 
LN(CVTURN)  -0.40 (-6.18)  
-0.90 
(-12.24)  
-0.72 
(-9.78)  
-0.76 
(-9.20) 
 
E(IVOL)×LN(ME)     
-0.06 
(-
14.20) 
-0.05 
(-
11.77) 
  
IVOL×LN(ME)       -0.05 (-9.29) 
-0.03 
(-5.27) 
R2 3.69% 5.62% 5.70% 7.88% 6.75% 8.63% 9.52% 11.40% 
We estimate cross-sectional regressions for every month from July of 1963 to December of 2009, a total of 
558 months. The dependent variable in the monthly regressions is the holding period return on all firms in 
our sample that have information on all explanatory variables in that month. The explanatory variables are 
as defined in Table 1.1. All the explanatory variables (except for IVOL) are predetermined at time t, and 
are used to explain the variation in returns at time t. For every month, we estimate a model that is nested in 
the following cross- sectional regression: 
R, 	 
 $ +ABCD, $  EFGB, $ HEFAB/GB, $ MBNOPE, $  QBC7, 2, $ SEFCTF, $UEFVOCTF, $ WBNOPE X EFGB, $ ,  
This table summarizes the means of the coefficients from these cross-sectional regressions. The standards 
errors are calculated as in Fama and MacBeth (1973), but corrected for serial correlation as in Newey and 
West (1987). The corresponding test-statistics are presented in parentheses below each average coefficient. 
  
34 
 
Table 1.4: Isolating the net effect of idiosyncratic volatility on returns 
 
Panel A 
 NYSE Quartile 
 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
Mean LN(ME) 0.79 3.05 4.12 5.73 
     
Panel B 
 NYSE Quartile 
Net effect of E(IVOL) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
Net E(IVOL) Effect for 
Model 5 (table 1.3)a 0.28 0.14 0.07 -0.03 
Net E(IVOL) Effect for 
Model 6 (table 1.3)a 0.30 0.18 0.13 0.04 
a
 The net effect in these tables might deviate slightly from calculations using the interaction terms in table 
1.3 due to rounding in the presentation of those numbers. 
 
With the interaction term included, the coefficients on E(IVOL) in table 1.3 can no longer be interpreted as 
their stand-alone figures, but need to be interpreted at a certain level of the variable with which it is 
interacted (LN(ME)). This gives the “net effect” of E(IVOL) given a certain level of size: 
d,dBNOPE 	  M\a $ W\a EFGBc,YYYYYYYYYYYYY 
Panel A shows the average size EFGBYYYYYYYYYYY for firms in 4 size quartiles based on NYSE breakpoints. Panel 
B illustrates the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and return for firms in each of the four size 
quartiles. 
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Table 1.5: Zero-cost portfolios based on size and idiosyncratic volatility 
Each year in June, all sample stocks are assigned into 5 portfolios based on their market equity (with each 
portfolio having the same number of firms). Each month, the stocks in each of the size portfolios are sorted 
on expected idiosyncratic volatility and assigned to 5 portfolios. This double sort results in 25 portfolios, 
each with a time-series of monthly returns between July of 1963 and December of 2009, for a total of 558 
months. Panel A presents the value-weighted average returns for the 25 portfolios. The monthly value-
weighted portfolio returns for each of these 25 portfolios are then regressed on the Fama and French (1993) 
three factors (Rm, SMB, and HML).  
,efg(K]^_` 	  h $ i $ jGA $ kGE $ ,, 
where i=1 to 25 Size-E(IVOL) portfolios and t=1 to 558 months. Panel B presents the Jensen (1968) alphas 
from those regressions, as well as their test statistic (in parentheses). 
  
PANEL A: Value-weighted portfolio returns 
  Size Quintile 
  1 2 3 4 5 
E(IVOL) 
1 0.01 0.39 0.52 0.63 0.80 
2 -0.37 0.32 0.55 0.81 0.69 
3 -0.11 0.31 0.59 0.76 0.56 
4 0.48 0.55 0.75 0.91 0.57 
5 5.95 3.22 1.80 1.37 0.52 
 Diff 5.95 2.83 1.29 0.73 -0.28 
 
      
PANEL B: Value-weighted portfolio alphas 
  Size Quintile 
  1 2 3 4 5 
E(IVOL) 
1 -1.15 (-13.65) 
-0.56 
(-7.94) 
-0.30 
(-4.74) 
-0.16 
(-3.04) 
-0.04 
(-0.73) 
2 -1.41 (-13.70) 
-0.70 
(-8.63) 
-0.32 
(-4.89) 
-0.08 
(-1.51) 
-0.01 
(-0.17) 
3 -1.03 (-7.43) 
-0.66 
(-7.72) 
-0.37 
(-0.37) 
-0.18 
(-3.03) 
0.03 
(0.67) 
4 -0.28 (-1.42) 
-0.35 
(-3.15) 
-0.24 
(-3.14) 
-0.03 
(-0.42) 
0.04 
(0.65) 
5 6.11 (15.60) 
2.16 
(8.35) 
0.72 
(4.17) 
0.23 
(1.66) 
0.03 
(0.26) 
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Table 1.6: Portfolio returns with trading costs considered 
 
Panel A: Value-weighted portfolio returns 
 
 Size Quartile 
 
 1 2 3 4 
E(IVOL) 
1 -0.20 0.15 0.47 1.02 
2 -0.44 0.42 0.45 1.19 
3 0.00 -0.47 0.42 1.19 
4 4.58 1.27 0.33 1.97 
 
Diff 4.79 1.13 -0.14 0.95 
 
     
Panel B: Value-weighted portfolio returns considering trading costs 
 
 Size Quartile 
 
 1 2 3 4 
E(IVOL) 
1 -5.59 -2.61 -1.39 0.24 
2 -7.38 -3.97 -2.28 0.32 
3 -7.52 -4.23 -2.43 0.25 
4 -0.09 -0.49 -0.31 0.60 
Each year in June, all Nasdaq stocks with available data on bid-ask spread are assigned into four portfolios 
based on their market equity (with each portfolio having the same number of firms). Each month, the stocks 
in each of the size portfolios are sorted on expected idiosyncratic volatility and assigned to four portfolios. 
This double sort results in 16 portfolios, each with a time-series of monthly returns between Jan of 1973 
and December of 2009, for a total of 444 months. Panel A presents the value-weighted average returns for 
the 16 portfolios. Panel B presents the average returns for the portfolios when one-way trading costs (based 
on half of the bid-ask spread) are considered.  
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Table 1.7: Summary statistics by size  
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for a sample of NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq stocks between July of 
1963 and December of 2009 divided into size quartiles. Four size portfolios are formed based on NYSE 
breakpoints in June and the procedure rolls every year. The table presents summary statistics for each of the 
portfolios. Variable definitions are as in Table 1.1. All variables except for RET, RET-RF and BETA have 
been winsorized at 99.5% and .5%. Observations with returns exceeding 300% have been excluded. 
  
 Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
Var Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std 
RET (%) 1.16 19.15 0.97 14.08 0.98 12.61 0.93 10.54 
RETRF (%) 0.70 19.16 0.55 14.08 0.57 12.61 0.51 10.55 
BETA 1.35 0.35 1.25 0.38 1.16 0.34 1.04 0.30 
LN(ME) 0.79 1.27 3.05 0.78 4.12 0.85 5.73 1.22 
LN(BEME) -0.24 1.16 -0.56 0.99 -0.63 0.93 -0.75 0.87 
RET(-2,-7) 0.93 7.62 1.27 6.19 1.24 5.39 1.18 4.53 
LN(TURN) 1.32 1.05 1.65 1.13 1.67 1.19 1.56 1.21 
LN(CVTURN) 4.33 0.42 4.04 0.39 3.90 0.37 3.67 0.37 
E(IVOL) 13.63 9.58 10.12 6.64 8.87 5.35 7.55 4.08 
IVOL 15.25 12.33 10.04 7.28 8.61 6.13 7.11 4.82 
E(IVOL)×LN(ME) 9.76 22.03 31.66 24.19 37.25 25.56 43.77 26.66 
IVOL×LN(ME) 11.96 23.80 31.03 25.52 35.90 28.49 41.06 31.03 
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Table 1.8: Cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions by size quartiles 
 
 Panel A Panel B 
 Size quartile Size quartile 
 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
LN(ME) 1.91 (4.95) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
0.25 
(1.09) 
0.18 
(1.92) 
1.36 
(5.17) 
0.74 
(2.54) 
0.54 
(2.53) 
0.56 
(6.26) 
LN(BE/ME) 0.65 (8.73) 
0.28 
(4.58) 
0.23 
(3.68) 
0.07 
(1.09) 
0.59 
(7.36) 
0.29 
(4.90) 
0.23 
(3.91) 
0.09 
(1.43) 
E(IVOL) 0.40 (11.73) 
0.14 
(1.51) 
0.23 
(1.98) 
0.25 
(2.91)     
IVOL     0.44 (10.85) 
0.38 
(4.03) 
0.42 
(3.28) 
0.59 
(6.05) 
RET(-7,-2) 0.04 (2.87) 
0.07 
(4.68) 
0.03 
(1.67) 
0.03 
(1.58) 
0.14 
(5.48) 
0.10 
(6.34) 
0.04 
(2.53) 
0.02 
(1.16) 
LN(TURN) -0.71 (-9.71) 
-0.28 
(-3.37) 
-0.14 
(-2.22) 
-0.08 
(-1.08) 
-0.92 
(-10.85) 
-0.53 
(-7.40) 
-0.23 
(-3.96) 
-0.03 
(-0.47) 
LN(CVTURN) -0.92 (-8.35) 
-0.71 
(-6.55) 
-0.39 
(-4.05) 
-0.28 
(-2.91) 
-0.93 
(-6.84) 
-0.81 
(-7.62) 
-0.44 
(-5.35) 
-0.16 
(-1.85) 
E(IVOL)×LN(ME) -0.12 (-2.83) 
0.01 
(0.13) 
-0.05 
(-1.32) 
-0.04 
(-2.79)     
IVOL×LN(ME)     -0.01 (-0.25) 
-0.03 
(-0.76) 
-0.07 
(-2.23) 
-0.10 
(-5.83) 
R2 10.12% 9.99% 10.37% 12.63% 13.37% 13.31% 13.50% 15.36% 
Net Effect Of 
E(IVOL)a 0.31 0.15 0.04 0.00 0.43 0.29 0.12 0.00 
a The net effect in these tables might deviate slightly from calculations using the interaction terms and mean 
size for each quartile due to rounding in the presentation of those numbers. 
 
Panel A presents the average coefficients for the main time-series regression model by size quartiles (based 
on NYSE stocks). In every month, regressions were run with monthly returns (RET) as the dependent 
variable and LN(ME), LN(BE/ME), E(IVOL), RET(-2,-7), LN(TURN), LN(CVTURN), and 
E(IVOL)×LN(ME). All the explanatory variables (except for IVOL) are predetermined at time t, and are 
used to explain the variation in returns at time t. This table summarizes the means of the coefficients from 
these cross-sectional regressions by size quartiles. The standards errors are calculated as in Fama and 
MacBeth (1973), but corrected for serial correlation as in Newey and West (1987). The corresponding test-
statistics are presented in parentheses below each average coefficient. The variables relate to a sample of 
NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq stocks between July of 1963 and December of 2009. Panel B presents the same 
regression, but using the realized measure of idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) instead of the expected 
idiosyncratic volatility measure (E(IVOL)). 
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Table 1.9: Alternative measures of trading costs 
 
 Liquidity quartile 
 1 2 3 4 
LN(ME) 0.26 (7.87) 
0.30 
(7.24) 
0.19 
(3.68) 
-0.35 
(-0.71) 
LN(BE/ME) 0.44 (7.91) 
0.53 
(9.00) 
0.38 
(5.03) 
-1.10 
(-0.89) 
E(IVOL) 0.35 (13.80) 
0.33 
(7.82) 
0.27 
(2.64) 
1.04 
(0.74) 
RET(-7,-2) 0.05 (3.55) 
0.04 
(3.08) 
0.07 
(4.15) 
-0.26 
(-1.09) 
LN(TURN) -0.17 (-1.12) 
-0.73 
(-1.73) 
-1.29 
(-1.70) 
10.55 
(1.17) 
LN(CVTURN) -0.66 (-7.22) 
-0.73 
(-8.81) 
-0.86 
(-7.66) 
-0.859 
(-0.64) 
E(IVOL)×LN(TURN) 0.02 (0.93) 
0.05 
(0.88) 
0.11 
(0.70) 
-1.28 
(-1.10) 
R2 10.01% 9.65% 10.30% 10.14% 
This table presents the average coefficients for the main time-series regression model (Model 6, table 1.3) 
by liquidity quartiles. Liquidity quartiles are based on the liquidity measure (TURN). In every month, for 
each liquidity quartile, we run regressions with monthly returns (RET) as the dependent variable and 
LN(ME), LN(BE/ME), E(IVOL), RET(-2,-7), LN(TURN), LN(CVTURN) and E(IVOL)×LN(TURN). All 
the explanatory variables (except for IVOL) are predetermined at time t, and are used to explain the 
variation in returns at time t. This table summarizes the means of the coefficients from these cross-sectional 
regressions. The standards errors are calculated as in Fama and MacBeth (1973), but corrected for serial 
correlation as in Newey and West (1987). The corresponding test-statistics are presented in parentheses 
below each average coefficient. The variables relate to a sample of NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq stocks 
between July of 1963 and December of 2009.  
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Table 1.10: Variations over time 
 
 Time period 
 
1963-1978 1979-1994 1995-2009 
LN(ME) 0.33 (4.50) 
0.90 
(12.32) 
0.90 
(13.75) 
LN(BE/ME) 0.36 (3.90) 
0.54 
(6.81) 
0.42 
(6.03) 
E(IVOL) 0.32 (10.12) 
0.31 
(13.96) 
0.39 
(11.52) 
RET(-7,-2) 0.05 (2.26) 
0.06 
(3.87) 
0.05 
(2.14) 
LN(TURN) -0.31 (-2.68) 
-0.39 
(-4.59) 
-0.55 
(-4.83) 
LN(CVTURN) -0.63 (-7.73) 
-0.41 
(-3.78) 
-1.13 
(-7.14) 
E(IVOL)×LN(ME) -0.04 (-4.00) 
-0.06 
(-9.28) 
-0.06 
(-10.36) 
R2 11.45% 6.46% 8.04% 
This table presents the average coefficients for the main time-series regression models by time periods. For 
every month, we run regressions with monthly returns (RET) as the dependent variable and LN(ME), 
LN(BE/ME), E(IVOL), RET(-2,-7), LN(TURNOVER), LN(CVTURNOVER) and E(IVOL)×LN(ME). All 
the explanatory variables (except for IVOL) are predetermined at time t, and are used to explain the 
variation in returns at time t. This table summarizes the means of the coefficients from these cross-sectional 
regressions over three different time periods. The standards errors are calculated as in Fama and MacBeth 
(1973), but corrected for serial correlation as in Newey and West (1987). The corresponding test-statistics 
are presented in parentheses below each average coefficient. The variables relate to a sample of NYSE, 
Amex, and Nasdaq stocks between July of 1963 and December of 2009.  
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ARE THE U.S. EQUITY MARKETS DOMESTICALLY INTEGRATED? 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Both the NYSE and Nasdaq maintain that companies should regularly review 
their listing decision. "To the extent that Corporate America chooses not to do that, it 
leads to an unhealthy situation," says Robert Greifeld, president and chief executive 
officer of Nasdaq. […] A spokesman for the NYSE stated that every company "has that 
duty to the shareholders to make sure they're listed on the right marketplace" and should 
evaluate it "in a way that benefits their shareholders the best." (CEO.com (2006)) 
 
Most papers in empirical finance implicitly or explicitly assume the same price of 
risk, for each priced systematic risk factor, across all risky assets within a given domestic 
market. In doing so, they rely on the assumption that markets are domestically integrated 
and, as such, the aggregate risk aversion of all investors determine the prices of risk. This 
is true in frictionless markets where investors have complete information, homogenous 
beliefs, and hold the mean-variance efficient combination of the market portfolio and a 
risk-free asset. However, investors might not hold the market portfolio because of 
exogenous reasons.6 In fact, several recent papers have provided evidence that US 
investors do not, holding instead vastly undiversified portfolios (Barber and Odean 
(2000)). 
There are two main implications to the above. First, if one group of investors does 
not hold the market portfolio, then the remaining set of investors will also not be able to 
                                                          
6
 Exogenous barriers to holding the market portfolio include incomplete information, limits on short sales, 
imperfect divisibility of securities, lack of liquidity, transactions costs, and taxes (e.g., Merton (1987)). 
42 
 
hold the market portfolio and will rationally expect to be compensated for bearing 
idiosyncratic risk (e.g., Malkiel and Xu (2002)). Therefore, idiosyncratic risk will be 
priced in expected returns. Second, the price of risk need not be the same across all assets 
(e.g., Lintner (1971), Rubinstein (1973)), in which case domestic markets are not 
integrated. Stated differently, if two identical firms are held by different subset of 
investors, they could have different required rates of return, which would imply that 
markets are segmented. Related to the first, several recent papers find that idiosyncratic 
risk is priced in U.S. equity returns even though the evidence is mixed (see, e.g., 
Lehmann (1990), Malkiel and Xu (2002), Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006), 
Spiegel and Wang (2007), Fu (2009), and Chua, Goh, and Zhang (2010)). 
In contrast, there is relatively little empirical work on the issue of whether the 
price of systematic risk is the same for all domestic assets and, as such, whether the major 
US exchanges are integrated. Given that priced idiosyncratic risk is inconsistent with 
domestic integration (see, e.g. King, Sentana, and Wadhwani (1994)), the mixed evidence 
on whether idiosyncratic risk is priced demands that we take a closer look at the issue of 
domestic integration. That is, if investors face obstacles to diversification, then “different 
securities are held by different subsets of investors” with the implication that the “price of 
risk […] varies inversely with the summation of the risk-tolerances of the investors who 
have [the stock] in their portfolios” (Lintner (1971)). This holds in the domestic market 
as strongly as it does in the international setting. 
The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we examine if U.S. equity markets 
are domestically integrated over the period 1985 to 2009 by examining if commonly used 
systematic risk factors have different risk prices in the different domestic markets. 
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Although prior research finds that US markets are domestically segmented7, since these 
papers have been written several systematic risk factors have emerged as important in 
explaining the cross-section of returns.  If risk prices depend on the factors included in 
the asset pricing model and less so on the particular test assets (King, Sentana, and 
Wadhwani (1994)), then given that any asset pricing test of integration is a joint test of 
integration and the correct specification of the model, omitting these factors could bias 
our results in a manner that is not obvious a priori. For instance, momentum and liquidity 
are currently accepted factors in the asset pricing literature so including these factors in 
integration tests is extremely important. In particular, if firms that list on US exchanges 
have different characteristics, then it is likely that these firms differ in liquidity and 
sensitivity to momentum, which has been found in prior papers (Sagi and Seasholes 
(2006)). To the extent that these omitted factors are correlated with the included factors, 
risk factor prices would be distorted. 
Second, we investigate whether and how domestic integration has changed over 
time. This is important for several reasons and theory is not clear on the direction of the 
change in integration. As investors become more sophisticated, and markets become 
increasingly liquid, it could be argued that integration should increase. However, as stock 
markets become more competitive, they are likely to differentiate and attract different 
subsets of firms that are held by investors with different preferences (see the opening 
quote). By doing so, segmentation could have increased over time. Moreover, evidence in 
Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) indicates that idiosyncratic risk has been 
increasing over time, suggesting that markets might be becoming more segmented.  
                                                          
7
 See Chen and Knez (1995), and Naranjo and Propopapadakis (1997). More recently Flood and Rose 
(2005) test for domestic integration but Parsley and Schlag (2007) demonstrate that their results do not 
hold. 
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if markets are segmented, the implications 
of such segmentation would depend on why it arises and, therefore, we address this. A 
priori, we hypothesize that segmented markets could depend on three things. One, 
markets could be segmented due to different investor groups preferring to hold assets 
with particular characteristics and the different exchanges generally list firms with 
specific characteristics. In turn, each investor group demands a different price of risk for 
systematic risks. We term this the investor-segmentation hypothesis. Several papers have 
found results that are consistent with this hypothesis (see section 5).  Two, markets could 
appear segmented due to arbitrage constraints that would prevent rational diversified 
investors from taking advantage of the apparent mispricing. If so, rational investors could 
not profitably exploit the mispricing and the results would have few, if any, implications. 
For example, Bassin (1998) find that the abnormal returns that firms document when 
changing their listing venues cannot be exploited by arbitrage. If those abnormal returns 
are due to different prices of risk in the markets, then this suggests that investors are 
unable to exploit such opportunities due to arbitrage constraints. Three, the markets could 
appear to be segmented due to the bad-model problem. Since any integration test using a 
factor model is subject to the joint-hypothesis problem, these tests are as well. 
Using an expanded time frame (1985-2009), relative to previous work, we find 
strong evidence of market segmentation between the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq. We find 
that the price of several common risk factors differ between the markets, some having 
more than twice as high a price in one market as in the other markets. Secondly, we find 
that integration has changed over time, but not in a clear linear fashion. More 
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importantly, we find that segmentation is present in all our sub periods and, hence, is not 
driven by any specific time period. 
Finally, we find evidence consistent with our investor-segmentation hypothesis. 
Given that certain characteristics (size and B/M) are likely to be used by different 
investor groups to screen their preferred stocks, we compare the price of risk for firms 
that are at different ends of the continuum of these characteristics (e.g., small versus large 
firms) and find that they have significantly different (statistically and economically) 
prices of risk. We also find that these results are not driven by arbitrage constraints. In 
addition to excluding firms with a stock price of less than $5 (throughout the paper), we 
also exclude firms in the bottom 10% of market value, and find that the segmentation 
results remain. In another test, we exclude the firms with the highest 10% of idiosyncratic 
volatility in the previous month (since these firms arguably would be the most expensive 
to arbitrage). Even so, we find that the segmentation results are robust. Since the prior 
tests are subject to the dual-hypothesis problem, we also test for segmentation using the 
model-free method suggested by Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2011) which is 
based on industry-level earnings yield differentials across the markets. Consistent with 
the model-specific tests, the results using this approach also indicate that the markets are 
segmented. Hence, our results point to investor segmentation as being the driver for the 
observed market segmentation. 
Our work is not the first to examine the question of domestic segmentation of the 
US markets.  The current paper contributes to, but is different from, others in this line of 
research in several ways.  Chen and Knez (1995) examine if the mean squared distance 
between stochastic discount factors for firms on the NYSE and Nasdaq is zero (strong-
46 
 
form integration), or some minimum amount (weak-form integration). They reject strong-
form integration, but fail to reject weak-form integration. Naranjo and Propopapadakis 
(1997) compare NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq stocks and reject the hypothesis that the 
NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq are integrated. Both Chen and Knez (1995) and Naranjo and 
Propopapadakis (1997) conclude that the domestic equity markets are segmented but are 
silent on the cause of segmentation.  Our work builds on these previous papers not only 
because our more recent sample period reflects the fact that market integration might 
have evolved over time in a direction that is not known a priori, but also because we test 
and eliminate the most likely causes of segmentation, and then present a potential reason 
for our findings.   
Recently, Goyal, Perignon, and Villa (2008) find that NYSE/Amex and Nasdaq 
have three priced factors each, but that only two of those factors are common across both 
markets. Our work addresses the complementary question of whether these common 
factors are commonly priced across markets, because in markets where the priced risks 
are different the price of risk is unlikely to be the same (Bekaert and Harvey (1995)). 
Ang, Shtauber, and Tetlock (2011) compare return premiums for stocks on listed markets 
compared to the over-the-counter market and find differences in the factors that are 
priced in the markets, as well as differences in the premiums of the factors that are priced. 
Our work differs from theirs in that while they focus on comparing the systematic risk 
price of OTC stocks with listed stocks, we compare the price differences for stocks in 
different listed stock markets where, a priori, the factors that might cause segmentation 
are less obvious. 
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Our work has implications for studies that attribute the significant abnormal 
announcement-day return for firms that list on a larger/national exchange to the investor-
recognition and superior-liquidity hypothesis (see, e.g., Kadlec and McConnell (1994)). 
If different clienteles display a preference for firms listed on the different exchanges, thus 
leading to differences in the price of risk, then firm value is expected to change even 
without an expected change in future cash flows.  
Furthermore, our work contributes to the literature on style investing (see e.g., 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003)), which argues that commonly accepted risk “factors” are 
likely priced due to investors allocating their assets based on the characteristics 
underlying these “factors”. Furthermore, this strand of research finds a higher co-
movement in prices among assets in a given style category. We expand the style and co-
movement literature by investigating whether such style investment can lead to different 
risk prices across assets and/or markets. 
Likewise, our work is relevant to the research that finds greater co-movement 
between stock returns of firms listed on the same stock exchange (see e.g., Barberis, 
Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005) and Kaul, Mehrotra, and Stefanescu (2006)). The co-
movement literature finds that changes in fundamentals cannot explain the co-movement, 
suggesting instead ‘‘friction-based’’ and ‘‘sentiment-based’’ explanations. However, the 
literature does not make a distinction between whether a change in the quantity of risk 
(beta), the risk factors, or different prices of risk are driving the co-movement. If the 
same systematic risks have different risk prices on the different exchanges, then we 
would expect co-movement even without a change in the quantity of risk. 
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The paper is organized as follows. The second section introduces the data and 
presents summary statistics. The third section investigates if systematic risk is priced 
differently in the domestic equity markets. The fourth section investigates time trends in 
integration. The fifth section explores reasons for segmented domestic markets, and the 
sixth section concludes. 
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2. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
To conduct the various tests, three sets of data are required.  The first set contains 
returns on the test assets. The second set contains the systematic risk factors that have 
been shown to impact the cross-section of returns. The third set contains the firm 
characteristics that have been shown to impact the cross-section of stock returns. The data 
are obtained from three sources. Daily and monthly individual security data for all firms 
traded on NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq from 1973 to 2009 are obtained from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We obtain data on stock returns (RET), prices (P), 
shares outstanding (SHROUT), and volume (VOL). We also obtain value-weighted index 
returns from CRSP. Accounting data or, more specifically, book values, are obtained 
from Compustat’s annual fundamentals file. Due to the limited availability of volume 
data for stocks traded on the Nasdaq before 1983, together with the fact that we need 
monthly volume data for at least two years in order to estimate one of our explanatory 
variables, we limit the final sample to the period from 1985 to 2009. We exclude firms 
with a price below $5. This eliminates approximately 26% of firms (or, on average, 1031 
firms per month), who make up approximately 0.7255% of total market value8. Hence, 
the screen works to eliminate small, illiquid firms that are likely to have significant 
arbitrage constraints from the sample. 
A. Test asset 
The test assets used in this paper are individual stock returns for all firms traded 
on the three major US exchanges. Monthly holding period returns are obtained through 
CRSP. Holding period returns (RET) include capital gains as well as dividend yields. 
                                                          
8
 These statistics are not reported in the tables of the paper 
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B. Systematic risk factors 
To estimate the sensitivity to the systematic risk factors for each firm, we follow 
the methodology of Ang, Shtauber, and Tetlock (2011) and regress individual firm 
returns from month t-24 to t-1 on the proxies for the factors. To estimate the firm 
sensitivities (betas) to the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, we regress 
monthly firm returns on the CRSP value weighted index, the SMB, and the HML factor9. 
We roll the regressions monthly. To be eligible for estimation, we require that a firm has 
returns in all the months of the estimation period (e.g., 24 months of data).  
Since Fama and French developed their factors in 1993, much research has been 
focused on explaining cross-sectional returns. Liquidity and momentum are two of the 
most frequently used variables that have been shown to impact cross-sectional returns. 
Since Amihud and Mendelson (1986) introduced liquidity as a factor, several papers have 
shown that it is important in the cross-section of returns (see, e.g., Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam 1996; Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe 1998; Chorida, Subrahmanyam and 
Anshuman 2001; Amihud 2002; Pastor and Stambaugh 2003). Similarly, Jagadeesh and 
Titman (1993) show that a momentum effect is present in stock price movements and 
Jagadeesh and Titman (2001), among others, find that the effect has remained significant 
long after it was discovered. Therefore, we augment the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model with proxies for these factors. 
                                                          
9
 The SMB and HML factors are created as in Fama and French (1993). A detailed description on how to 
form those factors is available from Ken French’s website at Dartmouth. The correlation between the 
factors available from Ken French’s website and the ones we create exceed .97 for all factors. 
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In order to estimate the sensitivity to Momentum, we create the Carhart (1997) 
momentum factor, as described by Ken French10. Every month we sort firms, 
independently, on size and the prior year’s return (excluding the last month). We form 
two portfolios on size (using NYSE median) and three on the prior year’s return (using 
the 30th and 70th percentile on NYSE stocks). The momentum factor, UMD is then 
calculated as the mean return on the two portfolios with the highest prior yearly return, 
minus the mean return on portfolios with the lowest prior yearly return. As a proxy for 
liquidity, we develop a factor based on the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. Every 
month we sort firms, based on the prior month’s illiquidity (see equation 2 below). The 
illiquidity factor is then calculated as the equal-weighted average return of firms with the 
highest 30 percent illiquidity lagged one month minus the equal-weight average of firms 
with the lowest 30 percent illiquidity return lagged one month. Both the momentum 
factors, as well as the liquidity factor, are updated monthly. 
In order to estimate firms’ sensitivity to these factors, we follow the methodology 
of Ang, Shtauber, and Tetlock (2011) and regress firm returns on the Market, SMB, and 
HML in addition to each of these factors, one at a time. Hence, a firm’s sensitivity with 
respect to the momentum factor is calculated by regressing returns on the three Fama and 
French (1993) factors in addition to the momentum factor. Similarly, the sensitivity to the 
liquidity factor is estimated by regressing returns on the Fama and French (1993) factors 
in addition to the liquidity factor. Explicitly, for every month t we estimate a model 
nested in the following time-series model for each firm i, using data from month t-24 
until t-1, and record the betas associated with each firm/month for each factor: 
                                                          
10
 A detailed description on how to form the Momentum factors is available from Ken French’s website at 
Dartmouth 
52 
 
  R, 	 α $ mnMkt $ eJSMB  $ q`HML $ rsUMD $  ` ]vLIQ $ ε. (1) 
Fama and MacBeth (1973) point out that betas estimated in this fashion are likely 
to be estimated with error, since the high beta estimations are likely to be overestimated, 
and the low beta estimates are likely to be underestimated. We note that this would bias 
against finding both that the factor premia are significant (since additional noise is 
introduced and our standard errors are likely to be inflated) and that the markets are 
segmented (since relatively small factor premia are less likely to be statistically 
significantly different).  
C. Firm characteristics 
Fama and French (1992) show in their seminal paper that size and book-to-market 
ratio are able to explain the cross-section of stock returns. Even though Fama and French 
(1993), along with several other papers, argue that the characteristics proxy for 
underlying systematic risk factors, other authors (Daniel and Titman (1997)) argue that 
the firm characteristics themselves often do better in predicting stock returns than the 
underlying factors. Acknowledging that it might be the characteristics and not the 
underlying factors that are priced, we measure the characteristics of interest for use in 
cross-sectional regressions as a complement to the sensitivity to the risk factors measured 
above. 
We estimate size and book-to-market ratio as in Fama and French (1992) for each 
of our securities. Size and book-to-market are calculated in June every year, and used 
from July in that year until June in the following year. Size (ME) is measured by the 
market value of equity (shares outstanding multiplied by price) in June of year t. The 
calculated size is then assigned to a firm for the following twelve months, starting in July 
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of year t until June of year t+1. BE/ME is the book-to-market ratio, calculated using 
December (t-1) market value of equity and the book value of equity for the fiscal year 
that ended in year t-1.  BE/ME is, like size, updated in July. The time lag used is to 
ensure that the information was available to investors at the time it is used in the analysis. 
We take the natural logarithm of both the market value (ME) and the book-to-market 
value (BE/ME). 
We calculate illliquidity as in Amihud (2002), but on a monthly basis. Every day 
in a month, we calculate the ratio of the daily absolute returns to the dollar trading 
volume. The illliquidity measure used for month t is then the average ratio for the days in 
the previous month (t-1).  
     ILLIQ, 	 1 y,(+z  ∑ |[,\}~,|[,\}~,b [,\}~,s[,\}~*+  , (2) 
where y,(+ is the number of days for which data are available for stock i in month t-1 
and ,(+, is the return on stock i on day d in month t-1. Volume,(+, and 
share price,(+, are the volume and share price, respectively, for stock i on day d in 
month t-1. We require at least 15 trading days for a firm in month t-1 with reported 
values of volume and share price in order to calculate the Amihud illiquidity measure for 
time t. 
The measure of momentum, RET (-12, -2) is calculated as the compounded 
holding period return between month t-12 to t-2. We exclude the last month’s (t-1) return 
to avoid returns merely due to bid-ask bounce. As can be seen in the variable definitions, 
all systematic risk factors are estimated using data up until t-1 and are therefore 
predetermined at time t.  
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Due to the need of volume data to calculate illiquidity, and the fact that Nasdaq 
does not consistently report volume until the end of 1982, we limit our sample to between 
January of 1985 and December 2009 for our cross-sectional regressions, so that we have 
data on all our explanatory variables.  
This results in a total of 1,247,583 firm-month observations over the 300 month 
sample window. All explanatory variables are winsorized monthly at the 5% and 95% 
level in order to avoid giving extreme observations a heavy weight. 
D. Summary statistics 
Summary statistics for firms listed on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq are 
presented in Table 2.1. The average (arithmetic) returns is quite different across the 
markets. NYSE has average monthly returns of 1.41%, while the average return is 2.23% 
for Amex and 2.38% for Nasdaq. As we know, the average size (market capitalization) of 
firms on the NYSE is a lot larger than those on the other two exchanges. The same holds 
true for the share price, which is approximately three times higher on the NYSE, than on 
Amex and Nasdaq. The average share price for NYSE stocks is $69.17 while the 
corresponding price is $19.94 on Amex and 19.66 on Nasdaq. Firms on the Nasdaq 
appear to be more growth oriented (lower BE/ME) than the firms trading on the NYSE 
and Amex. Our measures of liquidity show that NYSE stocks are much more liquid (less 
illiquid) than Nasdaq and Amex stocks. 
E. Correlation between the variables for each market 
Every month we estimate the Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables in 
each market. We report the time series mean of those correlation coefficients, as well as 
their significance based on their time-series standard errors. Most correlation coefficients 
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are very similar across the three markets. The mean betas related to the market, SMB, 
HML, and liquidity are positively correlated to returns in all three markets (even though 
the correlation is not always statistically significant). The mean momentum (UMD) beta 
is negatively correlated to returns in all markets. There does not seem to be any concern 
regarding multi-collinearity between our variables of interest. 
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3. MARKET INTEGRATION TESTS 
In this section we test which factors are priced in each of the markets (sub-section 
A) and whether the price of risk is different for the different markets (sub-section B).  
The question of whether or not U.S. equity markets are domestically integrated is 
important for several reasons. First, if the reward for each unit of systematic risks is not 
the same in each market, then it would be possible to increase the total reward without 
altering total risk by shifting investments to markets with higher reward for the given 
risk. Hence, it would present obvious arbitrage opportunities for investors. Second, 
investment and financing decisions would not be independent as the cost of capital would 
depend on the market in which projects are financed. Hence, markets would be 
allocationally inefficient, which would impose a social cost, and lead to a suboptimal 
growth rate. Third, these tests have implications for, and the results cannot be inferred 
from, tests of international integration11 which implicitly assume that markets are 
domestically integrated. This is because it is possible that two national markets appear 
internationally integrated because particular subsectors (such as that containing the 
largest firms, which are typically held by a common set of global investors) are 
internationally integrated but within each domestic market these subsectors are not fully 
integrated with the rest of the market that is typically held by domestic investors.12  
While the NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq provide the same service, there are several 
important differences between the exchanges, that could influence which firms chose to 
list in each market and, in turn, create a clientele effect whereby different investor groups 
                                                          
11
 Bekaert and Harvey (1995), Bekaert, Hodrick, Zhang (2009), and others. 
12
 An example of this is that investable stocks in emerging markets appear fairly highly integrated 
internationally, but are not integrated with non-investable stocks (see, e.g., Carrieri, Chaieb, and Errunza 
(2010)). 
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have distinct preferences for the firms trading on one exchange and not the others. First, 
listing requirements and costs are very different between the markets, suggesting that 
different firms might chose to list on the two markets. Technology and growth companies 
have historically been more prominent on the Nasdaq, while large blue chip firms have 
been predominantly listing on the NYSE. Corwin and Harris (2001) analyze the factors 
that affect firms’ listing decisions and find that firms are more likely to list on the same 
exchange as their industry peers. Further, they find that smaller, riskier firms are more 
likely to list on the Nasdaq, consistent with avoidance of delisting costs. Baruch and Saar 
(2009) find that listing decisions influence the liquidity of assets. More specifically, they 
find that a firm that chose to list on a market where similar stocks trade has greater 
liquidity. 
Second, Fama and French (2004) find that after 1972 approximately 90% of new 
listings chose to list on Nasdaq. When taken together with the finding that new listings 
are dominated by younger firms (Fama and French (2000)), these differences are likely to 
lead to the situation where firms of broadly similar characteristics list on a particular 
exchange and the firms listing on the different exchanges have different characteristics 
which could attract a specific clientele of investors.13 
A. Testing which risk factors are priced in the domestic markets 
In Table 2.3, we present the results from Fama and MacBeth (1973) type 
regressions. In every month t, we estimate a model that is nested in the following cross-
sectional regression: 
                                                          
13
 Moreover, as seen from the opening quote, exchange executives themselves think that there is an 
optimum match between the listing exchange and the firm. As such, they might be explicitly or implicitly 
contributing to this clientele effect. 
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(3) 
where R, is the return in month t for stock i and the betas are the estimated firm 
sensitivities to the systematic risk factors in month t for each firm i from equation (1). 
The model is estimated separately for firms on the different exchanges. The price of risk, 
λ9, for risk factor k will, therefore, be specific to a particular market. This allows us to 
determine if commonly used systematic risk factors are priced on the individual 
exchanges. Table 2.3 summarizes the means of the coefficients from these cross-sectional 
regressions over our estimation period between Jan of 1985 and Dec of 2009, a total of 
300 months. The t-statistics, calculated as in Fama and MacBeth (1973)) but corrected for 
three lags of serial correlation as in Newey and West (1987), are presented underneath 
each coefficient.  
Model 1 shows the results of the basic model containing the betas with respect to 
the market, SMB and HML factors. The results indicate that systematic risk, both with 
respect to the market and the size factors, are significantly priced in all three markets. 
Surprisingly, the systematic risk represented by HML only seems to be significantly 
priced on the NYSE. A further look shows that the magnitude of the price of market risk 
differs substantially across the markets. Several prior papers have found the relation 
between beta and returns to be flat in the cross-section of stock returns (Fama and French 
(1992, 1993)), which is in stark contrast to what we find here. While the premium for one 
unit of market beta risk is a modest .326% per month in the NYSE, it is approximately 
50% higher (.473%) in the Nasdaq and twice as large (.667%) in Amex. With regards to 
the size factor, the premium also appears much larger for stocks traded on the Nasdaq and 
59 
 
Amex than for NYSE stocks. The size factor premium is .218% on the NYSE, and 
approximately 50% higher for stocks trading on the Amex (.317%) or Nasdaq (.308%). 
The second model specification augments the three-factor model of Fama and 
French (1993) by adding the momentum and liquidity factors. The qualitative results 
from Model 1 hold after including these additional risk factors. In our sample, 
momentum is not significantly priced in any of the markets. Given that our sample 
excludes stock with a price below $5, and empirical research have shown that momentum 
seem to be most pronounced for small stocks (see Sagi and Seasholes (2006) and 
Bergbrant (2011)), this might explain why the risk represented by momentum does not 
appear significantly related to returns in our sample. In contrast, the premia for liquidity 
risk is significant in all markets. Similarly to the factor premium for market risk and 
SMB, the premium for liquidity is also much larger on the Amex and Nasdaq than on 
NYSE. 
The finding that there are factors that are priced across all markets but other 
factors are priced in only a subset of markets is consistent with the results in Goyal, 
Perignon, and Villa (2008) and Ang, Shtauber, and Tetlock (2011). Overall, the above 
results indicate that there are economically large differences in the price of risks across 
exchanges, tentatively indicating that the markets are domestically segmented. 
In the last two models, we explain the cross-section of returns using 
characteristics, as Daniel and Titman (1997) and others argue that characteristics do a 
better job in explaining the cross-section of stock returns than factor loadings. If investors 
hold only a certain subset of stocks, which ultimately leads to domestic segmentation, 
then investors might choose the subset of stocks in which to invest based on certain stock 
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characteristics. If so, this could explain why characteristics have been shown to better 
price assets than factors formed on the basis of these characteristics (see e.g., Daniel and 
Titman (1997)). Following this explanation, characteristics such as size could appear 
priced due to the fact that the subset of investors that hold large stocks require different 
prices of risk than those investors who hold small stocks.  
When using characteristics to explain the variation in stock returns, as opposed to 
factor loadings, the results are similar. Size appears important (statistically significant) in 
all specifications14, while B/M is significant and positive only for NYSE firms in Model 
3. Turning to Model 4 there are some interesting results. When adding momentum and 
liquidity to the model, B/M emerges as significantly negatively related to returns on the 
Amex (it remains positive and significantly related to returns on the NYSE). As in Model 
2, momentum remains insignificantly related to return, and liquidity remains important in 
the extended model. 
As these regressions reveal, there appear to be several differences between the 
markets with respect to the risk factors. The differences in the premia between the 
markets suggest that the prices of systematic risk may differ across the three markets, 
which would imply that the markets are not integrated. In the next section, we investigate 
whether the markets are, in fact, integrated. 
                                                          
14
 The negative sign on the coefficient on size in the characteristics regressions (larger firms’ earnings 
lower returns) is consistent with the positive coefficient in the factor models on SMB, where firms more 
sensitive to the small-minus-large factor earn higher returns. 
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B. Are the U.S. equity markets integrated? 
In order to investigate if the three domestic US markets are integrated we proceed 
by comparing the risk prices of commonly used risk factors across the markets 
(subsection i) as well as conduct time-series asset pricing tests (subsection ii). 
i) Prices of risk across the markets 
Since our aim is to investigate whether the prices of systematic risk differ across 
the markets, we estimate a model that allows for the price of risks to differ across the 
markets and allows us to test for statistical differences in these prices of risk. The model 
is a modification of that presented above (equation 3), as it includes a dummy variable 
defined as one for stocks that are listed on Amex and zero otherwise (Amex). It also 
includes a second similarly defined dummy variable for firms listed on Nasdaq (Nasdaq). 
The dummy variables are included in the model as standalone variables and interacted 
with the risk factors.  As standalone variables they allow for different intercepts across 
the three markets, while the interaction terms allow us to determine if the prices of risk 
differ across the markets. Specifically, we estimate: 
 R, 	 a $ a Amex $ aNasdaq $ ∑ λ.,,9Q9*+ $ ∑ λ., ,9 bQ9*+ Amex  $
∑ λ., ,9Q9*+ b Nasdaq $ ε,, 
(4) 
where λ., is the price of risk for factor k in time t on the NYSE, and λ¡., is the 
incremental price of risk for factor k,  in time t, on exchange x (where x = a represents 
Amex and x = n represents Nasdaq). As can be inferred from the dummy variables in 
equation (4), NYSE is the omitted market. Hence, the coefficient estimate on the 
interaction terms represents the incremental price of risk for stocks trading on Amex and 
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Nasdaq, relative to those trading on NYSE. The test statistic for these interaction terms 
indicates whether the price of risk on the Amex and Nasdaq, respectively, is statistically 
significantly different from that on the NYSE. 
The results are reported in Table 2.4, where the coefficients on the various risk 
factors for Amex and Nasdaq stocks are the incremental price of risk, relative to the price 
of risk for NYSE stocks. Hence, for Amex or Nasdaq the total price of risk for a 
particular factor is the sum of the price of risk for NYSE stocks plus the incremental price 
of risk for Amex or Nasdaq. They indicate that several of the systematic factors have a 
different price of risk in the different markets. Focusing on Model 1, and comparing 
Amex and NYSE, the results indicate that the price of market risk is significantly higher 
on Amex than on NYSE. Further, the price of HML risk is significantly lower on both the 
Amex and Nasdaq than on NYSE. Adding the momentum and liquidity factor does little 
to change the relations just described. In addition, liquidity appears to be significantly 
higher priced on both the Amex and Nasdaq as compared to the NYSE. Momentum 
remains insignificant in all models.  
Turning to the models using characteristics, they show that, if the characteristics 
are priced, the premia would differ between the NYSE and Nasdaq (and Amex) for both 
size, book-to-market, and liquidity. Hence, the segmentation results are even stronger 
using the characteristic models than they are using the factor loading models. 
Strong-form integration requires the risk prices to be the same for the markets in 
every period. In our tests, we investigate whether the average risk prices have been 
different over our entire sample period. As such, these tests would be considered 
conservative, so the results strongly imply that the domestic markets are segmented. 
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These results are consistent with the evidence in Chen and Knez (1995) and Naranjo and 
Protopapadakis (1997)) over a sample period that ends nearly two decades prior to ours. 
ii) Time-series asset pricing tests 
We also test the hypothesis of segmentation using time series tests. In addition to 
the “global” factors created previously created using data from all the three exchanges, 
we also create exchange-specific factors (independently created for each exchange) using 
each exchanges individual breakpoints. We then form 25 portfolios (sorted on book-to-
market and size) for each exchange and use those (3×25=) 75 portfolios as test 
portfolios15. If the markets are integrated, we expect that the global factors would explain 
the variation in the portfolios over time and that exchange-specific factors would be 
redundant and not add any explanatory power.  
We then regress the monthly returns on each of the (75) portfolios on the global 
factors and record the R2s. We then include the exchange-specific factors and investigate 
whether the exchange-specific factors significantly improve the fit of the model. We find 
that for 96% of the three factor models, the exchange-specific factors are important (72 
out of the 75 portfolios).16 This provides support to the previous results that the US 
markets are domestically segmented. Furthermore, adding the additional two factors, 
momentum and liquidity, does not change the results. The exchange-specific factors 
remain important in 96% (72 out of 75) of the portfolios when we estimate the five-factor 
models. This strongly implies that the domestic US markets are segmented. 
                                                          
15
 The results are very similar when using independently sorted portfolios. 
16
 These tests are not reported for brevity, but are available upon request. 
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4. CHANGES IN INTEGRATION OVER TIME 
Having shown that the domestic markets over the entire sample period, 1985 to 
2009, are segmented naturally raises the question of how market integration has evolved 
over time. At first, it might seem natural that markets should be increasingly integrated, 
due to the fact that technology has made information more readily available over time. 
With advanced computer power, we now have the ability to research more stocks, 
diversify easier, and trade at a lower cost. At the same time, computerized trading allows 
investors to exploit arbitrage opportunities quickly. Furthermore, increasing similarities 
between the stock exchanges could have caused greater similarity between the 
characteristics of firms that chose to list on the three exchanges. That is, in the early 
1970s most firms that listed on the Nasdaq did not have the option to list on the NYSE. 
Today, more firms have the opportunity to choose which exchange they want to list on.  
However, the investment climate has also changed. Exchanges that were 
complementary a few decades ago, such as NYSE and Nasdaq, have grown into 
competitors. In an increasingly competitive industry, which has lately been characterized 
by several acquisitions and mergers, the exchanges are being forced to differentiate 
themselves.  This differentiation could attract both specific subset of firms, and subset of 
investors. As Nasdaq has grown to become known for technology firms (often growth 
firms), NYSE has continued to focus on staple firms (often focused on value). Hence, it 
would be likely that firms that previously could not chose where to list, now make an 
active choice based on which market best fits their needs. To the degree that this is true, 
we would expect markets to become less integrated over time. Moreover, evidence in 
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Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) indicates that idiosyncratic risk has been 
increasing over time, suggesting that markets might be becoming more segmented.  
Furthermore, it is possible that markets change in their levels of integration over 
time without a clear direction. If markets are segmented because different groups of 
investors hold different securities, then market segmentation could increase if the risk 
aversion of the different investor groups changes at different times (or changes by 
different amounts at a particular time). For example, if individual investors hold Nasdaq 
stocks and institutions own NYSE stocks, then segmentation would increase in the event 
that individual investors become more risk averse relative to institutional investors. 
Hence, changing levels of segmentation over time, without a clear time trend would be 
consistent with investor- driven segmentation.   
To test the time trends of segmentation, we split the sample into subperiods, the 
first spanning the years 1985 through 1992, the second covers 1993 to 2000, and the third 
time period covers the years 2001 until 2009. 
To determine how integration changes (if it changes) over time we re-estimate the 
model with the interaction terms, equation (4), for Nasdaq and Amex, where NYSE is the 
omitted exchange, over the three subperiods. The results from these regressions are 
presented in Table 2.5.  
There are three interesting things to note in Table 2.5. First, there does not seem 
to be a clear time-trend in integration (e.g. integration does not change linearly over 
time). Secondly, the risk factors that seems to imply segmentation changes over time and 
the magnitude of those differences changes as well. For example, the price of HML risk 
is significantly higher on Amex than on NYSE in the first sub-period, but significantly 
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lower in the subsequent sub-periods.  Turning to market risk, we find that its risk price is 
significantly higher on Nasdaq as compared to NYSE in the first and last sub-period, but 
appears to be lower in the middle sub-period. This is consistent with the investor-driven 
segmentation hypothesis described briefly above. Third, and perhaps most importantly, 
segmentation is present in all sub-periods and, hence, is not driven by any particular 
period. 
To provide the reader with a picture of the time variation of domestic 
segmentation we present a plot of the risk prices from the base model (Figure 2) and their 
differences (Figure 3), where the latter depicts the individual systematic risk prices for 
Amex or Nasdaq stocks minus the same for NYSE. Figure 217 is informative as to the 
variation in the prices of risk over time, which is consistent with asset pricing models. 
 For instance, it is noticeable that prices of risk tend to be larger in magnitude in periods 
when the economy is performing poorly as investors are worried about future 
consumption and, as such, utility of consumption is high.  Hence, investors demand 
higher risk prices. It also appears that there is less variation in the market price of risk and 
less difference in risk prices over time.  In contrast, we observe greater time variation and 
greater differences in the prices of HML and SMB risks between the exchanges.  With 
respect to the latter, the risk prices tend to be larger on Amex and Nasdaq than on NYSE. 
This is possibly because the latter exchanges are, for the most part, the preferred habitat 
of retail investors who are more prone to vary their demand for compensation for 
exposure to risk. If markets were perfectly domestically integrated, then the difference in 
risk prices would be zero, on a period-by-period basis. While this is not likely in practice, 
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 The series have been smoothed using Hodrick-Prescott filters, with the recommended smoothing (14400) 
for monthly data 
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large differences, especially for lengthy periods, are indicative of segmentation.  Figure 3 
indicates that the differences are large in the 1999-2001 periods and then starts declining 
over the next few years. Interestingly, segmentation seems to increase again during the 
last years of the sample, which coincides with the financial crisis. Given that there was a 
crisis in both the 1999-2001 and the 2007-2009 periods, it seems plausible that 
segmentation is in fact driven by a differential rate of change of the risk aversion and, in 
turn, the expected compensation for bearing a unit of systematic risk, of the different 
investor groups. 
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5. WHY ARE THE MARKETS SEGMENTED? 
In order to test why the prices of risk differ across the markets we first need to 
form a set of hypotheses as to why the prices of risk could differ. As stated in the 
introduction, different investors might prefer to hold stocks with specific characteristics, 
leading to investor segmentation and, therefore, potentially different prices of risk for 
different subsets of stock. Several papers suggest that this could be the case (see below). 
We term this the investor-segmentation hypothesis. From a market efficiency standpoint, 
segmented investors would be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to cause different 
prices of risk across different securities. If a few rational, diversified investors exist, that 
would be enough to ensure efficient pricing of securities due to risky arbitrage (Fama 
(1965)). Hence, in order for domestic markets to be segmented, it is necessary to have 
both domestic securities held by different investors who demand different prices of risk 
for the securities they hold and arbitrage constraints. In this scenario, the appearance of 
differences in risk prices across the markets could be due to stocks with high arbitrage 
constraints and, therefore, be an artifact of the data. Bergbrant (2011) finds that 
idiosyncratic volatility, as measured by either expected idiosyncratic volatility from 
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models or realized idiosyncratic 
volatility, is unrelated to returns for large firms, consistent with the idea that small firms 
are arbitraged constraint. If arbitrage constraints are the reason that risk prices remain 
different, it would not be exploitable, and therefore would have limited real implications 
for investors. We term this the arbitrage-driven segmentation hypothesis. 
Finally, as with all asset pricing tests, there is the risk of model misspecification. 
Since all asset pricing tests of integration are joint tests of both the model being used is 
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well specified and the hypothesis of integration, differences in risk prices across the 
markets could be due to model misspecification, such as an omitted, priced factor. We 
attempt to control for this in several ways. First, we specify several different asset pricing 
models, based both on firms’ sensitivities to systematic risk factors as well as firm 
characteristics. In addition, we employ tests that are not structured asset pricing tests and, 
therefore, less susceptible to the joint-hypothesis problem. 
A. Investor-Segmentation Hypothesis 
Several papers provide evidence that is consistent with the idea that different 
types of domestic securities are held by different investors. For instance, several papers 
find that institutional investors prefer certain stocks. Pruitt and Wei (1989) find that 
changes in institutional holdings are positively correlated with additions and deletions to 
the S&P500, suggesting that institutional investors prefer to hold stocks that are in the 
index. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) find that institutions have a preference for large 
stocks and stocks that pay dividends.18 
Further, many funds such as index funds, by definition, hold a subset of firms. 
Shleifer (1986) and Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) show that firms’ price rise 
substantially upon inclusion in the S&P500 index. Such a gain is likely due to mechanical 
rebalancing of index funds, but suggests that the firm becomes a part of a group of stocks 
owned by a different subset of investors, who possibly demand a different price of 
systematic risks. Given that Standard and Poor’s explicitly states that inclusion in the 
index does not reflect a change in the firms’ future prospects and, hence, the inclusion 
contains no new information the increase in the price of the stock is consistent with the 
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 See, also, Badrinath, Kale, and Noe (1995) who argue that some stocks are institutionally favored and 
some are institutionally unfavored. 
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new investors demanding a lower price of risks. Petajisto (2010) find that index funds 
incur additional costs by being mechanically tied to holding the index at all times, 
providing further evidence that investors care about certain subsets of firms. Considering 
their choice to incur these additional costs, they must enjoy greater benefits from the 
shares than other investors, suggesting that they might price the risks of the stock 
differently from other investors. 
Other research has shown that there is a home bias in equity returns. Coval and 
Moskowitz (2002) find that investors have a preference for investing in firms that are 
local. Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2008) confirm these results domestically and find that in 
regions with few company headquarters stock prices are higher for those companies. This 
preference for local firms shows that investors prefer certain subsets of firms, which 
could lead to different prices of risk for different firms.  
In addition, it is common to refer to mutual fund “style drift” as a negative 
phenomenon, partly because it alters the risk structure that funds claim to follow, and 
partly because the managers stray away from their area of expertise, which is detrimental 
to performance in the long run. Since investors often specialize in one area, such as 
growth stocks, or large stocks, they would likely hold a diversified portfolio with regards 
to the subset of assets that they specialize in. If these stocks are predominantly held by 
the same type of investors, they would evaluate systematic risk compared to their 
portfolio holdings, and could demand different prices of risks than other investors 
specializing in different stocks. 
Furthermore, it has become a well-known fact that many investors are 
undiversified. Looking at retail investors, Goetzmann and Kumar (2004) find that more 
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than 25% hold a single stock in their portfolios. Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Zu 
(2001) argue that investors need approximately 50 stocks in their portfolios to be 
diversified. Goetzmann and Kumar (2004) find that less than 10% of retail investors’ 
portfolios contain more than 10 stocks. If retail investors chose to invest in a different 
subset of firms than other investors, this could manifest itself in the form of different 
prices of risk for that subset of firms. In addition, it could lead to priced idiosyncratic 
volatility (if calculated with respect to the market portfolio). This has been documented 
by among other, Ang, Hodrick, Xing, Zhang (2006)) and Fu (2009). Bergbrant (2011) 
makes the point that the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and returns, expected as 
well as realized, is limited to firms which are difficult to arbitrage (low liquidity), and 
stocks more likely to be held by individual investors (small stocks).  
To test the investor-segmentation hypothesis we look at subsets of firms which 
are likely to be predominantly traded by different subsets of investors. As mentioned 
above, mutual funds often focus on stocks with certain characteristics, such as large 
stocks or growth-oriented stocks. If segmented investors truly drive the different risk 
prices between the markets, then we would expect firms with different levels of the 
characteristics most likely to be used by different investor groups to screen their preferred 
stocks to have different risk prices even if they are listed on the same exchange. 
Alternatively, we would expect no differences in the prices of risk between different 
portfolios of firms with similar levels of these characteristics even if the portfolios are 
from different exchanges. We, therefore, test the investor-segmentation hypothesis by 
comparing the prices of risk for firms based on size (market capitalization), as well as 
based on growth prospects (book-to-market). We select size and book-to-market because 
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they represent characteristics used by investors to screen stocks for their portfolio. It is 
widely believed, especially in the United States, that institutional investors make 
investment decisions based on categories.19 Froot and Teo (2008) find evidence 
consistent with this belief, and find that institutions reallocate fund across groupings on 
size, book-to-market, as well as sectors. Kumar (2009) finds that this holds true also for 
individual investors. He finds that individual investors shift their preferences across 
extreme portfolios based on size and growth prospects. Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang 
(2009) note that “the style of a portfolio, value versus growth or small versus big, has 
long been a main organizing principle in the U.S. asset management industry.” 
Similarly, the behavioral finance literature also stresses the potential importance 
of style classification for stock return comovements. Boyer (2011) extends the co-
movement literature by showing that arbitrary style categories (book-to-market) 
influences co-movement in asset prices. Hence, if the segmented investor hypothesis is 
the reason that the exchanges are segmented, and investors segment along the lines of 
style categories such as size and book-to-market, then we would expect the prices of risk 
to be different along these styles. We, therefore, test if the prices of risk are different for 
firms in groups based along these characteristics. 
We re-estimate the regressions represented by equation (4) and reported in Table 
2.4, but instead of allowing risk prices to differ across the three exchanges, we allow risk 
prices to differ for firms with different size and book-to-market ratios. It should be noted 
that the size portfolios are based on all the stocks that are listed on the three exchanges. In 
this way, the size-sorted portfolios are essentially equally affected by other characteristics 
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 See e.g. “Curtains Coming Down on the Sensational Small-Cap Show,” The Financial Times, August 3, 
2006, “Smart Money Stock Screen/Bargain Growth,” The Wall Street Journal, May 18, 2006. 
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that might differentiate, say, Nasdaq and NYSE stocks and potentially cause 
segmentation. We sort firms on size and on book-to-market, respectively, into three equal 
groups (based on the number for firms). The results are presented in Table 2.6. The 
results indicate that the prices of risk differ, both statistically and economically, for the 
different size groups (Table 2.6, Panel A) as well as for the different book-to-market 
groups (Table 2.6, Panel B). Focusing on Model 1 (Panel A), the evidence indicates that 
market beta risk is significantly (t-stat of 5.14) priced for small firms and that the risk 
price is significantly larger than that for large firms. As indicated by the sum of the price 
of risk for small firms and the incremental risk price for large firms, the price of market 
risk for large firms is economically small. Thus, it appears that market beta risk is 
unrelated to returns for the largest stocks. The results are highly similar for the SMB 
factor. The risk price is economically large (0.581% per month) and significant for small 
firms, but are significantly smaller for medium firms and essentially zero for large firms. 
Interestingly, for the HML factor, the evidence indicates that the price of risk for small 
firms is of the opposite sign (negative) to that for medium and large firms. Assuming that 
HML reflects growth opportunities, this implies that greater growth opportunities reduce 
the cost of equity for small firms (see Fama and French (1992)).  
Including a momentum and liquidity factor, Model 2, leads to essentially the same 
results. Turning to Models 3 and 4, the same results also hold when using characteristics 
instead of factor loadings. In these models, the prices of risk for all priced factors are 
economically larger for small firms than for medium or large firms. This is consistent 
with Sagi and Seasholes (2006) who find that momentum strategies yield higher returns 
for small firms. 
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Turning to Panel B, where we allow prices of risk factors to differ across firms 
with different levels of book-to-market, the inferences are highly similar. We find that the 
prices of risk are significantly larger (in magnitude) for firms with high book-to-market 
than for firms with low book-to-market ratios.  
Taken together, these results suggest that investors with strong preferences for 
small (low book-to-market) firms demand a different compensation for exposure to a unit 
(beta) of the same systematic risk relative to investors that prefer large (high book-to-
market) firms.  The unwillingness of investors to change their portfolio allocation, 
therefore, lends support to the investor-segmentation hypothesis.  
B. Arbitrage Constraints  
We now consider the role, if any, of arbitrage constraints in the segmentation 
previously reported.  It is important to note that it is undesirable for segmentation to be 
solely driven by micro-capitalization firms, which would make any investment strategies 
arising from segmentation difficult, if not impossible to implement. Therefore, for all 
tests in this essay, firms with a price of less than $5 have been excluded from the sample.  
However, we are still concerned that arbitrage constraints could be the main 
driver of the segmentation that has been found in the preceding tests. In order to test our 
second hypothesis, the arbitrage-driven segmentation hypothesis, we exclude firms that 
are likely to have severe arbitrage constraints. Several papers suggest that small stocks 
have higher arbitrage constraints than large stocks. Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) find 
that small stocks tend to have higher arbitrage risk and find a highly significant, negative 
correlation between their measure of risk of arbitrage and size. Furthermore, Pontiff 
(2006) argues that small stocks, due to their high transaction costs, are more expensive to 
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arbitrage. This implies that size is a good proxy for arbitrage constraints. We, therefore, 
exclude the 10% of firms in our sample with the lowest market value and re-estimate the 
tests. The choice of excluding 10% of stocks is twofold. First, we require a large enough 
sample, so that we do not limit the stocks to those held by the same subset of investors. 
Secondly, we need to ensure that we eliminate all stocks that have severe arbitrage 
constraints, which could influence our results. Another common proxy for difficulties to 
arbitrage is idiosyncratic volatility. In additional tests (sub-section ii), we compare the 
prices of systematic risk factors excluding firms in the decile of highest lagged 
idiosyncratic volatility (see Ang, Hodrick, Xing, Zhang (2006)). 
i) Excluding small firms 
In order to determine if the differences in the prices of risk across the markets are 
due to arbitrage constraints we re-estimate the model in equation (4) excluding the 
smallest 10% of firms judged by market capitalization in the prior month. The results are 
presented in Table 2.7 (Panel A). Excluding the small firms does little to change the 
results shown earlier. Segmentation is still present between the exchanges. This suggests 
that arbitrage constraint is not the main driving force behind the segmentation. 
ii) Excluding high idiosyncratic volatility firms 
Table 2.7 (Panel B) shows the results when the 10% of firms with the highest 
idiosyncratic volatility in the prior month have been excluded. Once again, the results are 
very similar to those shown before. Segmentation is present even with these firms 
excluded. Hence, it does not appear as if arbitrage constraints are the reason that markets 
remain segmented. 
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C. Bad-Model Problem 
There are strong indications to believe that the market segmentation found in this 
paper is not due to model misspecification. Several papers have provided evidence 
consistent with domestic market segmentation, using methods that are not subject to the 
joint-hypothesis problem. In a recent paper Goyal, Perignon, and Villa (2008) show that 
NYSE/Amex firms and Nasdaq firms share two common risk factors, but each have an 
additional risk factor, not shared by the other exchange. Even though this is in itself not 
evidence of segmentation, it is consistent with segmentation. The alternative explanation, 
that risk is present in the NYSE/Amex market which Nasdaq firms are not exposed to, is 
less compelling. In another recent paper, Hegde, Lin, and Varshney (2010) show that 
firms that chose to dual list on both the NYSE and Nasdaq benefit from higher liquidity 
and lower spreads. Further, studies investigating firms that chose to change their listing 
venue from Nasdaq to NYSE (Baker and Edelman (1992), Kadlec and McConnell 
(1994)) or dual list (Baker and Khan (1994)) find that firms that chose to do so 
experience abnormal returns. This, too, is consistent with, but not proof of segmentation. 
The abnormal returns can be the result of decreasing risk (lower betas), lower risk premia 
(segmentation) or a combination thereof. However, since merely changing listing location 
should not have an effect on the quantity (beta) of most systematic risks (perhaps with the 
exception of liquidity and investor recognition risks (see Kadlec and McConnell (1994)) 
significant changes in returns seem more consistent with changing price of risks and, 
hence, segmentation. This, as previously argued, would be the case if different investor 
groups have a strong preference for firms listed on a particular exchange and demand a 
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different level of compensation for exposure to the same systematic risk than other 
investor groups that prefer firms listed on other exchanges. 
Nonetheless, to ensure that our results are robust, we test for integration using the 
method suggested by Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2011) which is model free 
and, therefore, is not susceptible to model misspecification. 
It is important to note that even though these tests allow us to determine if the 
markets are statistically integrated, the economic implications of the results are less 
straightforward. However, if the domestic markets are segmented using this method, then 
it is less likely that our previous results are due to model misspecification. 
Any model-specific test of integration is by definition a joint test between the 
asset pricing model used and integration. In order to make sure that the segmentation 
results are not driven by the specific asset pricing model, we employ a model-free test of 
integration. The segmentation measure, developed by Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and 
Siegel (2011) rely on the notion that the earnings yield should be similar for similar 
firms, regardless of the exchange on which they trade. The exchange-level measure is 
therefore based on industry-level earnings yield in excess of the average earnings yield 
across the three exchanges.  These differentials are aggregated across all industries in a 
given exchange. If the markets are integrated, then we would expect the earnings yield to 
be similar for firms in the same industry regardless of the exchange on which they trade, 
resulting in a value close to zero. The measure is constructed from firm level data from 
CRSP and Compustat. Every year, reported earnings (net income) are aggregated for each 
GIC industry group20 in each US exchange (NYSE, Amex, Nasdaq). The earnings yield 
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 While Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2011) use 38 industries according to DataStream industry 
classifications, we use 25 industries based on GIC industry groups. 
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(EY) for the particular industry (j) in each year (t) for each exchange (i) is then calculated 
by dividing the aggregate income by the aggregate market value for the included firms.21 
The measure of segmentation (SEG) is then calculated as the industry weighted 
difference between the absolute earnings yield in each exchange, industry, and year as 
compared to a global earnings yield measure (based on combining the firms in all three 
exchanges). Explicitly, SEG is calculated as 
 jB¢, 	  ∑ N£,¤,|B¥,¤,  B¥¦,¤,|§¤*+ , (5) 
where B¥,¤,  B¥,¤, is the difference in earnings yield (EY) between an industry (j) in a 
specific exchange (i) and that of the entire domestic market (w) in every year (t). The 
segmentation measure (SEG) is the industry weighted (IW) average of the absolute 
earnings yield differentials. This measure of segmentation only requires industry level 
earnings yield ratios, which are observed and not estimated, and therefore the measure is 
not subject to critiques of model misspecification. Since the integration measure is 
calculated solely for domestic firms, it is not subject to many of the shortcomings that 
would be present when applied internationally.22 However, it is still subject to the bias 
arising from using net income reported by firms, and not true economic earnings (see 
Black (1980)). If the three exchanges are integrated, we would expect that our measure of 
integration, SEG, is relatively small and constant over time (Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, 
and Siegel (2011)). One major drawback with calculating the measure for the domestic 
exchanges is that the NYSE makes up a very large part of the entire US market. Hence, 
we would not expect any segmentation between the NYSE and the total US market. 
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 Following Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2011) we set negative earnings equal to 0. 
22
 For a discussion of these shortcomings, see Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2011). 
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Therefore, instead of reporting the segmentation per exchange, we report the average 
segmentation score of the three exchanges over time.23 This could be seen as a measure 
of how integrated the Amex and Nasdaq exchanges are with the NYSE. 
The results from the model-free segmentation measure are presented in Figure 1. 
As can be seen, US domestic segmentation has decreased over time.24 This is interesting 
for at least two reasons. First, the fact that domestic segmentation has decreased is 
evidence that the domestic markets have been segmented during the period investigated. 
As discussed earlier, if the markets were not segmented, we would expect the measure of 
segmentation to be fairly constant over time. Secondly, the decrease in segmentation is 
consistent with the qualitative results presented in Table 2.4. It is also interesting to note 
that there is an increase in segmentation during the most recent financial crisis. 
Overall, the tests in this section provide strong support for the hypothesis that US 
stock markets are domestically segmented.  More important, they support the hypothesis 
that the main cause of segmentation is the investor-segmentation hypothesis–stock 
markets attract firms with certain general characteristics and certain investors have a 
stronger preference for these firms and not for other firms with different characteristics 
and which are listed on other exchanges.  Given that these investors only hold a part of 
the universe of stocks their demand for compensation for exposure to a unit of systematic 
risk varies with the portfolios they hold, thus leading to segmentation.   
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 The individual exchange segmentation scores are available from the authors upon request. 
24
 The time trend in segmentation is statistically significant, with a t-statistic of -3.11. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
We investigate whether the three main U.S. equity markets are domestically 
integrated by comparing the price of commonly used risk factors across the NYSE, 
Amex, and Nasdaq. We find that the markets have significantly different prices of risks 
for several risk factors, indicating that the markets are segmented. The magnitude of the 
difference is both statistically and economically significant. Further, we find that the 
segmentation has become less pronounced over the last decade, but that the markets 
remain segmented. The segmentation holds both for specific asset pricing model 
specifications, as well as for model-free integration tests. We also find evidence against 
the hypothesis that the segmentation is due to arbitrage constraints. Instead, we find 
evidence consistent with the investor-segmentation hypothesis, in which different 
investors choose to hold different subsets of firms and demand different prices of risk 
among the different groups of securities. These results highlight the value of 
diversification and suggest that domestic equity markets are not fully efficient. Further, it 
raises a concern with respect to testing for integration of international equity markets. If 
the characteristics of the stocks on a particular market impact the price of systematic 
risks, then testing integration from a standpoint where the price of risks is the same for all 
stocks would be troublesome, given that firm characteristics differ widely across 
international markets. Further, we open up the discussion of whether investors can 
profitably exploit the segmentation that has been revealed, both domestically and 
internationally.
81 
 
7. REFERENCES 
Ang, A., Hodrick, R., Xing, Y., Zhang, X., 2006. The cross-section of volatility and 
expected returns. Journal of Finance 61, 259-299. 
 
Ang, A., Shtauber, A., Tetlock, P., 2011. Asset pricing in the dark: The cross section of 
OTC Stocks. Working Paper, Columbia University. 
 
Amihud, Y., 2002. Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time- series effects. 
Journal of Financial Markets 5, 31–56.  
 
Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H., 1986. Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread. Journal of 
Financial Economics 15, 223–249. 
 
Badrinath, S., Kale, J., Noe, T., 1995. Of Shepherds, Sheep, and the Cross-
autocorrelations in Equity Returns. Review of Financial Studies 8, 401-430. 
 
Baker, K., Edelman, R., 1992. AMEX to NYSE transfers, market microstructure, and 
shareholder wealth. Financial Management 21, 60-72. 
 
Baker, K., Khan, W., 1994. The post dual listing anomaly. Journal of Economics and 
Business 46, 287-297. 
 
Barber, B., Odean., T., 2000. Trading is hazardous to your wealth; the common stock 
investment performance of individual investors. Journal of Finance 55, 773-806. 
 
Barberis, N., Shleifer, A., 2003. Style investing. Journal of Financial Economics 68, 161-
199. 
 
Barberis, N., Shleifer, A., Wurgler, J., 2005. Comovement. Journal of Financial 
Economics 75, 283-317. 
 
Baruch, S., Saar, G., 2009. Asset returns and the listing choice of firms. Review of 
Financial Studies 22, 2239-2274. 
 
Bassin, W., 1998. An evaluation of a trading strategy for stocks that switch exchanges 
from the Nasdaq to the NYSE. Working paper. 
 
Bekaert, G., Harvey, C., 1995. Time-varying world market integration. Journal of 
Finance 50, 403– 444. 
 
Bekaert, G., Hodrick, R., Zhang, X., 2009. International stock return comovements. 
Journal of Finance 64, 2591-2626. 
 
Bekaert, G., Harvey, C., Lundblad, C., Siegel, S., 2007. Global growth opportunities and 
market integration. Journal of Finance 62, 1081-1137. 
82 
 
 
Bekaert, G., Harvey, C., Lundblad, C., Siegel, S., 2007. What segments equity markets? 
Forthcoming in the Review of Financial Studies, 2012. 
 
Bergbrant, M., 2011. Is idiosyncratic volatility really priced? Working paper, University 
of South Florida. 
 
Black, F., 1980. The magic in earnings: Economic earnings versus accounting earnings. 
Financial Analyst Journal 36, 19-24 
 
Boyer, B., 2011. Style-Related Comovement: Fundamentals or Labels? Journal of 
Finance 66, 307-332. 
 
Brennan, M., Subrahmanyam, A., 1996. Market microstructure and asset pricing: on the 
compensation for illiquidity in stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics 41, 
441–464. 
 
Campbell, J., Lettau, M., Malkiel, B., Xu, Y., 2001. Have individual stocks become more 
volatility? An empirical exploration of idiosyncratic risk. Journal of Finance 56, 1-
43. 
 
Carhart, M., 1997. On persistence in mutual fund performance. Journal of Finance 52, 
57-82. 
 
Carrieri, F., Chaieb, I., Errunza, V., 2010. Do implicit barriers matter for globalization? 
Working paper. 
 
Chen, Z., Knez, P., 1995. Measurement of market integration and arbitrage. Review of 
Financial Studies 8, 287-325. 
 
Chen, L., Novy-Marx, R., Zhang, L. 2010. An alternative three-factor model. Working 
Paper.  
 
Chua C., Goh, J., Zhang, Z. 2010. Expected volatility, unexpected volatility, and the 
cross-section of stock returns. Journal of Financial Research 33, 103-123. 
 
Chordia, T., Subrahmanyam, A., Anshuman, V., 2001. Trading activity and expected 
stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics 59, 3–32. 
 
Corwin, S., Harris, J., 2001. The initial listing decisions of firms that go public. Financial 
Management, 30, 35-55. 
 
Coval, J., Moskowitz, T., 2002. Home bias at home: local equity preference in domestic 
portfolios. Journal of Finance 54, 2045-2073. 
 
83 
 
Daniel, K., Titman, S., 1997. Evidence on the characteristics of cross sectional variation 
in stock returns. Journal of Finance 52, 1-33. 
 
Datar, V., Naik, N., Radcliffe, R., 1998. Liquidity and stock returns: an alternative test. 
Journal of Financial Markets 1, 203–219. 
 
Fama, E., 1965. The behavior of stock market prices. Journal of Business 38, 34-105. 
 
Fama, E., French, K., 1992. The cross-section of expected stock returns. Journal of 
Finance 47, 427-465. 
 
Fama, E., French, K., 1993. Common risk factors in the returns of stocks and bonds. 
Journal of Financial Economics 33, 3-56.   
 
Fama, E., French, K., 2000. Disappearing dividend: changing firm characteristics or 
lower propensity to pay? Journal of Financial Economics 60, 3-43. 
 
Fama, E., French, K., 2004. New Lists: fundamentals and survivor rates. Journal of 
Financial Economics 73, 229-269. 
 
Fama, E., MacBeth, J., 1973. Risk, return and equilibrium: empirical tests. Journal of 
Political Economy 81, 607–636. 
 
Flood, R., Rose, A., 2005. Financial integration: A new methodology and an illustration. 
Journal of the European Economic Association 3, 1349-1359. 
 
Froot, K., Teo, M., 2008. Style investing and institutional investors. Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis 43, 883-906. 
 
Fu, F., 2009. Idiosyncratic risk and the cross-section of expected stock returns. Journal of 
Financial Economics 91, 24-37 
 
Goetzmann, W., Kumar, A., 2004. Why do individual investors hold under-diversified 
portfolios?   Working paper. Yale University. 
 
Goyal, A., Perignon, C., Villa, C., 2008. How common are common return factors across 
the NYSE and Nasdaq. Journal of Financial Economics 90, 252-271. 
 
Grinstein, Y., Michaely, R., 2005. Institutional holdings and payout policy. Journal of 
Finance 60, 1389-1426. 
 
Hegde, S., Lin, H., Varshney, S., 2010. Competitive stock markets: Evidence from 
companies’ dual listings on the NYSE and Nasdaq. Financial Analysts Journal 66.  
 
Hong, H., Kubik, J., Stein, J., 2008. The only game in town: stock-price consequences of 
local bias. Journal of Financial Economics 90, 20-37 
84 
 
 
Jegadeesh, N., Titman, S., 1993. Returns to buying winners and selling losers: 
implications for stock market efficiency. Journal of Finance 48, 65–92 
 
Jegadeesh, N., Titman, S., 2001. Profitability of momentum strategies: An evaluation of 
alternative explanations. Journal of Finance 56, 699-720 
 
Kaul, A., Mehrotra, V., Stefanescu, C., 2006.  Habitats and return comovement: evidence 
from firms that switch exchanges. Working Paper. 
 
Karolyi, A., 1995. A multivariate GARCH model of international transmissions of stock 
returns and volatility: The case of the United States and Canada. Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics 13, 11-25. 
 
Kadlec, G., McConnell, J., 1994. The Effect of Market Segmentation and Illiquidity on 
Asset Prices: Evidence from Exchange Listings. Journal of Finance 49, 611-636. 
 
King, M., Sentana, E., Wadhwani, S., 1994. Volatility and links between national stock 
markets. NBER working paper No. 3357. 
 
Kumar, A., 2009. Dynamic style preferences of individual investors and stock returns. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44, 607-640. 
 
Lehmann, B., 1990. Fads, martingales, and market efficiency. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 105, 1-28. 
 
Lintner, J., 1971. Capital market equilibrium with divergent borrowing and lending rates. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 6, 1197-1205. 
 
Lynch, A., Mendenhall, R., 1997. New evidence on stock price effects associated with 
changes in the S&P 500 index. Journal of Business 70, 351-383. 
 
Malkiel, B., Xu, Y., 2002. Idiosyncratic risk and security returns. Working paper. 
University of Texas at Dallas. 
 
Naranjo, A., Protopapadakis, A., 1997. Financial market integration test: an investigation 
using US equity markets. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions, 
and Money 7, 93-135. 
 
Parsley, D., Schlag, C., 2007. Measuring financial integration via idiosyncratic risk: What 
effects are we really picking up? Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 39, 1267-
1273. 
 
Pastor, L., Stambaugh, R., 2003. Liquidity risk and expected stock returns. Journal of 
Political Economy 111, 642–685. 
 
85 
 
Petajisto, A., 2010. The index premium and its hidden cost for index funds. Journal of 
Empirical Finance 18, 271-288. 
 
Pontiff , J., 2006. Costly arbitrage and the myth of Idiosyncratic Risk. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 42, 35-42. 
 
Pruitt, S., Wei, J., 1989. Institutional ownership and changes in the S&P500. Journal of 
Finance 44, 509-513. 
 
Rubinstein, M. 1973. A mean-variance synthesis of corporate financial theory. Journal of 
Finance 28, 167-181. 
 
Rubinstein, M. 1973. The fundamental theorem of parameter-preference security 
valuation. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 8, 61-69. 
 
Sagi, J., Seasholes, M., 2006. Firm-specific attributes and the cross-section of 
momentum. Journal of Financial Economics 84, 389-434. 
 
Shleifer, A., 1986. Do demand curves for stocks slope down? Journal of Finance 41, 
579-590. 
 
Spiegel, M., Wang, X., 2007. Cross-sectional variation in stock returns: liquidity and 
idiosyncratic risk. Working paper. 
 
Wurgler, J., Zhuravskaya, E., 2002. Does arbitrage flatten demand curves for stocks? 
Journal of Business 75, 583-608 
86 
 
Table 2.1: Summary statistics 
  
NYSE Amex Nasdaq 
 Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std 
N 388065 82926 562314 
RET(%) 1.41 11.31 2.23 14.63 2.38 16.56 
PRC($) 69.17 1710.68 19.94 50.06 19.66 33.39 
VOL 14.86 68.46 0.68 3.24 7.17 47.51 
beta_mkt 1.04 0.75 0.86 0.88 0.92 0.96 
beta_smb 0.47 1.04 0.84 1.23 0.84 1.24 
beta_hml 0.32 1.19 0.27 1.39 0.12 1.49 
beta_umd -0.08 0.87 -0.04 1.07 -0.07 1.09 
beta_liq 0.02 0.85 0.28 1.09 0.17 1.12 
LN(ME) 6.84 1.43 4.19 1.26 5.01 1.50 
LN(BE/ME) -0.57 0.68 -0.37 0.74 -0.68 0.76 
RET(-12,-2) 0.13 0.37 0.19 0.43 0.20 0.51 
AMIILL 0.07 0.32 0.79 1.30 0.71 2.06 
Table 2.1 shows descriptive statistics for the pooled sample. RET is the average monthly holding period return, 
reported in percent. PRC($) is the average stock price. VOL is the average monthly volume (in millions of shares). 
Beta_x are the firm sensitivity to the systematic risk factor x. Every month we regress individual firm returns from t-
24 to t-1 on the proxies for the risk factors and record the beta. To estimate the firm sensitivities (betas) to the Fama 
and French (1993) three factors, we regress monthly firm returns on the CRSP value weighted index, the SMB, and 
the HML factor. In order to estimate the betas for the momentum and liquidity factors, we regress the returns on the 
Fama and French (1993) factors as well as the other factor which beta we want to estimate. We roll the regressions 
monthly. To be eligible for estimation, we require that a firm has returns in all the months of the estimation period 
(e.g., 24 months of data). ME is defined as shares outstanding times the share price and is updated in June of every 
year (t) and used from July in that year (t) until June the following year (t+1). BE/ME is book-to-market ratio 
estimated as in Fama and French (1992); the fiscal year end book value (t-1) is divided by the calendar year end (t-1) 
market equity. A firm’s BE/ME is assigned to the firm from July in the year after it was estimated (t), until June 
(t+1) of the following year in order to ensure that it was available to investors at the time it is used to predict returns. 
RET(-12,-2) is the average stock return from month t-12 to t-2. AMIILL is Amihuds (2002) illiquidity measure 
estimated in the previous month. All explanatory variables have been winsorized at the 5% level.  
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Table 2.2: Cross-sectional correlations 
    RET(%) beta_mkt beta_smb beta_hml beta_umd beta_liq LN(ME) LN(BE/ME) RET(-12,-2) AMIILL 
NYSE 
RET(%) 1.000 0.010 0.018*** 0.015*** -0.009 0.014*** -0.034*** 0.025*** 0.006 0.029*** 
beta_mkt 0.010 1.000 0.063*** 0.354*** -0.100*** 0.051*** 0.036*** 0.001 -0.032** -0.058*** 
beta_smb 0.018*** 0.063*** 1.000 0.227*** -0.079*** 0.054*** -0.357*** 0.089*** -0.006 0.090*** 
beta_hml 0.015*** 0.354*** 0.227*** 1.000 -0.018* 0.005 -0.072*** 0.226*** -0.022* 0.029*** 
beta_umd -0.009 -0.100*** -0.079*** -0.018* 1.000 -0.371*** 0.042*** -0.079*** 0.110*** -0.023*** 
beta_liq 0.014*** 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.005 -0.371*** 1.000 -0.088*** 0.061*** -0.044*** 0.079*** 
LN(ME) -0.034*** 0.036*** -0.357*** -0.072*** 0.042*** -0.088*** 1.000 -0.322*** 0.046*** -0.395*** 
LN(BE/ME) 0.025*** 0.001 0.089*** 0.226*** -0.079*** 0.061*** -0.322*** 1.000 0.008 0.166*** 
RET(-12,-2) 0.006 -0.032** -0.006 -0.022* 0.110*** -0.044*** 0.046*** 0.008 1.000 -0.076*** 
Amex 
RET(%) 1.000 0.015** 0.010 0.013** -0.012** 0.034*** -0.061*** 0.018*** 0.001 0.090*** 
beta_mkt 0.015** 1.000 0.054*** 0.394*** -0.028*** 0.027*** 0.141*** -0.113*** 0.053*** -0.093*** 
beta_smb 0.010 0.054*** 1.000 0.208*** -0.017*** 0.040*** 0.003 -0.075*** 0.034*** -0.005 
beta_hml 0.013** 0.394*** 0.208*** 1.000 0.027*** 0.022*** -0.019*** 0.096*** -0.010 0.042*** 
beta_umd -0.012** -0.028*** -0.017*** 0.027*** 1.000 -0.334*** 0.005 -0.062*** 0.058*** -0.026*** 
beta_liq 0.034*** 0.027*** 0.040*** 0.022*** -0.334*** 1.000 -0.171*** 0.075*** 0.000 0.096*** 
LN(ME) -0.061*** 0.141*** 0.003 -0.019*** 0.005 -0.171*** 1.000 -0.352*** 0.003 -0.496*** 
LN(BE/ME) 0.018*** -0.113*** -0.075*** 0.096*** -0.062*** 0.075*** -0.352*** 1.000 0.018** 0.243*** 
RET(-12,-2) 0.001 0.053*** 0.034*** -0.010 0.058*** 0.000 0.003 0.018** 1.000 -0.155*** 
Nasdaq 
RET(%) 1.000 0.008 0.013** 0.003 -0.013*** 0.035*** -0.073*** 0.028*** -0.005 0.053*** 
beta_mkt 0.008 1.000 0.059*** 0.259*** -0.049*** 0.024*** 0.174*** -0.157*** -0.006 -0.129*** 
beta_smb 0.013** 0.059*** 1.000 0.165*** -0.035*** 0.059*** -0.021*** -0.072*** 0.019* -0.046*** 
beta_hml 0.003 0.259*** 0.165*** 1.000 0.011 0.013* -0.109*** 0.210*** -0.014 0.064*** 
beta_umd -0.013*** -0.049*** -0.035*** 0.011 1.000 -0.345*** 0.007 -0.065*** 0.071*** -0.014*** 
beta_liq 0.035*** 0.024*** 0.059*** 0.013* -0.345*** 1.000 -0.171*** 0.083*** 0.024** 0.091*** 
LN(ME) -0.073*** 0.174*** -0.021*** -0.109*** 0.007 -0.171*** 1.000 -0.385*** -0.023*** -0.442*** 
LN(BE/ME) 0.028*** -0.157*** -0.072*** 0.210*** -0.065*** 0.083*** -0.385*** 1.000 0.030*** 0.204*** 
RET(-12,-2) -0.005 -0.006 0.019* -0.014 0.071*** 0.024** -0.023*** 0.030*** 1.000 -0.092*** 
This table displays the time-series means of the cross-sectional Pearson correlation coefficients. In every month, for each exchange, we obtain the 
contemporaneous Pearson correlation coefficients between each pair of variables using the cross section of stocks. The reported correlation coefficients are the 
average over the sample period of 300 months. The coefficients relate to a sample of stocks traded NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq between Jan 1985 and December 
2009. Stars denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) respectively.
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Table 2.3: Cross sectional regressions with Fama-MacBeth (1973) T-stats 
    beta_mkt beta_smb beta_hml beta_umd beta_liq LN(ME) LN(BE/ME) RET(-12,-2) AMIILL Adj R-Sq OBS 
Model 1 
NYSE 0.326* 0.218** 0.156* 3.60% 388065 (1.84) (2.48) (1.75) 
Amex 0.667*** 0.317*** -0.039 2.40% 82925 (3.48) (2.65) (-0.31) 
Nasdaq 0.473*** 0.308*** -0.019 3.20% 562314 (2.64) (2.64) (-0.17) 
Model 2 
NYSE 0.283 0.192** 0.190** 0.031 0.251*** 4.60% 388065 (1.63) (2.23) (2.08) (0.30) (2.88) 
Amex 0.655*** 0.317*** -0.063 0.187 0.639*** 3.20% 82925 (3.48) (2.64) (-0.50) (1.33) (4.57) 
Nasdaq 0.465*** 0.293** -0.005 0.118 0.640*** 3.80% 562314 (2.68) (2.54) (-0.05) (1.32) (6.21) 
Model 3 
NYSE 0.336** -0.245*** 0.174** 3.00% 380438 (2.18) (-4.25) (2.09) 
Amex 0.646*** -0.731*** -0.130 2.20% 78679 (4.21) (-11.68) (-0.99) 
Nasdaq 0.488*** -0.821*** -0.170 3.10% 510302 (3.24) (-12.08) (-1.08) 
Model 4 
NYSE 0.129 -0.190*** 0.149* -0.239 0.614*** 4.70% 378834 (1.28) (-3.20) (1.87) (-0.51) (4.51) 
Amex 0.511*** -0.503*** -0.250* 0.111 0.739*** 4.20% 65949 (3.58) (-6.12) (-1.82) (0.31) (6.97) 
Nasdaq 0.336*** -0.817*** -0.112 -0.395 0.266*** 4.10% 459264 (2.93) (-10.00) (-0.76) (-1.18) (5.31) 
We estimate cross sectional regressions for every month from July of 1985 to December of 2009, a total of 300 months. The dependent variable in the monthly 
regressions is the holding period return on all firms in our sample that have information on all explanatory variables in that month. The explanatory variables are 
as defined in Table 2.1. All the explanatory variables are pre-determined at time t, and are used to explain the variation in returns at time t. For every month, we 
estimate a model that is nested in the following cross- sectional regression: 
                                                        R, 	 λ $ λ+,9 $ λ ,eJ  $ λH,q` $ λM,rs $ λQ,`]v $ λSEFGB, $ λUEF IJKKL, $ λWBC12, 2, $ λDGNNEE, $ ,,  
This table summarizes the means of the coefficients from these cross sectional regressions (commonly referred to as risk prices). The standards errors are 
calculated as in Fama and MacBeth (1973), but corrected for serial correlation as in Newey and West (1987). The corresponding test-statistics are presented in 
parentheses below each average coefficient. Stars denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) respectively.  
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 Table 2.4: Cross sectional regressions with interactions 
 
    beta_mkt beta_smb beta_hml beta_umd beta_liq LN(ME) LN(BE/ME) RET(-12,-2) AMIILL Adj R-Sq OBS 
Model 1 
NYSE 0.326* 0.218** 0.156* 
3.90% 1033304 
(1.84) (2.48) (1.75) 
Amex 0.341** 0.099 -0.195* (2.26) (0.92) (-1.71) 
Nasdaq 0.147 0.089 -0.175** (1.44) (0.95) (-2.31) 
Model 2 
NYSE 0.283 0.192** 0.190** 0.031 0.251*** 
4.70% 1033304 
(1.63) (2.23) (2.08) (0.30) (2.88) 
Amex 0.371** 0.125 -0.252** 0.156 0.388*** (2.32) (1.17) (-2.10) (1.24) (3.35) 
Nasdaq 0.181* 0.101 -0.195** 0.087 0.390*** (1.76) (1.10) (-2.54) (1.18) (5.56) 
Model 3 
NYSE 0.336** -0.245*** 0.174** 
3.70% 969419 
(2.18) (-4.25) (2.09) 
Amex 0.309** -0.486*** -0.304** (2.49) (-7.22) (-2.57) 
Nasdaq 0.152* -0.576*** -0.344*** (1.68) (-8.58) (-2.84) 
Model 4 
NYSE 0.129 -0.190*** 0.149* -0.239 0.614*** 
4.70% 904047 
(1.28) (-3.20) (1.87) (-0.51) (4.51) 
Amex 0.382*** -0.313*** -0.399*** 0.350 0.126 (2.85) (-3.75) (-3.21) (1.03) (0.76) 
Nasdaq 0.207** -0.627*** -0.262** -0.156 -0.347*** (2.14) (-9.05) (-2.31) (-0.63) (-2.60) 
We estimate cross sectional regressions for every month from July of 1985 to December of 2009, a total of 300 months. This regression is similar to the one in 
the previous table (Table 2.3), except that we create dummies for the different exchanges and interact those with the explanatory variables in the regression 
specification. We use NYSE as the base group. The coefficients can then be interpreted as the incremental effect of each explanatory variable on the Amex and 
Nasdaq exchanges, respectively, as compared to the NYSE. The standards errors are calculated as in Fama and MacBeth (1973), but corrected for serial 
correlation as in Newey and West (1987). The corresponding test-statistics are presented in parentheses below each average coefficient. Stars denote significance 
at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) respectively. 
                                                                              R, 	 a $ a Amex $ aNasdaq $ ∑ λ.,,9Q9*+ $ ∑ λ., ,9 bQ9*+ Amex $ ∑ λ., ,9Q9*+ b F
¨
> $ ε,  
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 Table 2.5: Sub-Period integration tests 
PANEL A: 1985-1992 
    Beta_Mkt Beta_SMB Beta_HML Beta_UMD Beta_Liq LN(ME) LN(BE/ME) RET(-12,-2) AMIILL Adj R-Sq OBS 
Model 1 
NYSE 0.136 0.156 0.042 
3.00% 301871 
(0.49) (1.06) (0.37) 
Amex 0.117 0.029 0.202** (0.62) (0.25) (2.42) 
Nasdaq 0.321** 0.131 -0.070 (2.20) (1.30) (-0.92) 
Model 2 
NYSE 0.176 0.159 0.023 0.053 0.108 
3.60% 301871 
(0.64) (1.12) (0.20) (0.52) (1.16) 
Amex 0.102 0.012 0.201** 0.003 0.096 (0.56) (0.11) (2.44) (0.03) (1.21) 
Nasdaq 0.311** 0.118 -0.079 0.071 0.214*** (2.16) (1.23) (-1.03) (0.83) (2.72) 
Model 3 
NYSE 0.164 -0.102 0.160 
3.00% 262554 
(0.63) (-1.00) (1.00) 
Amex 0.399** -0.526*** -0.116 (2.03) (-4.75) (-0.77) 
Nasdaq 0.282** -0.601*** -0.241* (2.07) (-6.95) (-1.81) 
Model 4 
NYSE 0.099 -0.011 0.154 0.346 0.720*** 
3.60% 240915 
(0.44) (-0.11) (1.00) (0.91) (5.10) 
Amex 0.216 -0.295** -0.213 -0.063 -0.096 (1.05) (-2.42) (-1.41) (-0.19) (-0.66) 
Nasdaq 0.213 -0.620*** -0.198 0.396 -0.507*** (1.51) (-8.46) (-1.57) (1.31) (-3.61) 
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Table 2.5 (cont.) 
PANEL B: 1993-2000 
    Beta_Mkt Beta_SMB Beta_HML Beta_UMD Beta_Liq LN(ME) LN(BE/ME) RET(-12,-2) AMIILL Adj R-Sq OBS 
Model 1 
NYSE 0.194 0.037 0.092 
3.90% 381638 
(1.23) (0.18) (0.52) 
Amex 0.438 0.424* -0.536** (1.41) (1.75) (-2.02) 
Nasdaq -0.060 0.345 -0.255 (-0.31) (1.51) (-1.52) 
Model 2 
NYSE 0.142 0.014 0.106 -0.126 0.121 
4.30% 381638 
(0.94) (0.07) (0.61) (-1.05) (1.03) 
Amex 0.501 0.416* -0.515* 0.020 0.511*** (1.53) (1.68) (-1.88) (0.13) (3.61) 
Nasdaq -0.013 0.345 -0.262 0.003 0.367*** (-0.07) (1.53) (-1.57) (0.03) (3.30) 
Model 3 
NYSE 0.201* -0.148 0.210 
3.50% 364024 
(1.81) (-1.62) (1.35) 
Amex 0.082 -0.516*** -0.437** (0.41) (-4.98) (-1.99) 
Nasdaq -0.272* -0.804*** -0.586* (-1.67) (-5.51) (-1.88) 
Model 4 
NYSE 0.125 -0.090 0.186 0.650 0.943*** 
4.30% 336854 
(1.32) (-0.89) (1.23) (1.59) (3.72) 
Amex 0.160 -0.361*** -0.464** 0.270 -0.076 (0.80) (-3.09) (-2.03) (0.61) (-0.24) 
Nasdaq -0.207 -0.840*** -0.479* -0.503 -0.570** (-1.47) (-4.91) (-1.69) (-1.35) (-2.22) 
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Table 2.5 (cont.) 
PANEL C: 2001-2009 
    Beta_Mkt Beta_SMB Beta_HML Beta_UMD Beta_Liq LN(ME) LN(BE/ME) RET(-12,-2) AMIILL Adj R-Sq OBS 
Model 1 
NYSE 0.613 0.436*** 0.313* 
4.80% 349795 
(1.54) (3.96) (1.75) 
Amex 0.453* -0.128 -0.244 (1.73) (-0.79) (-1.36) 
Nasdaq 0.177 -0.175 -0.197 (0.99) (-1.39) (-1.55) 
Model 2 
NYSE 0.504 0.379*** 0.411** 0.150 0.493** 
5.90% 349795 
(1.27) (3.45) (2.27) (0.61) (2.47) 
Amex 0.495* -0.034 -0.422** 0.415 0.539* (1.70) (-0.21) (-2.14) (1.36) (1.91) 
Nasdaq 0.239 -0.132 -0.239* 0.176 0.565*** (1.25) (-1.10) (-1.81) (1.06) (3.89) 
Model 3 
NYSE 0.610* -0.459*** 0.155 
4.50% 342841 
(1.78) (-4.96) (1.28) 
Amex 0.432* -0.424*** -0.354 (1.81) (-3.33) (-1.58) 
Nasdaq 0.414*** -0.351*** -0.220 (2.94) (-3.74) (-1.44) 
Model 4 
NYSE 0.159 -0.439*** 0.113 -1.549 0.227 
5.90% 326278 
(0.92) (-4.92) (1.04) (-1.34) (0.87) 
Amex 0.727*** -0.286 -0.507** 0.788 0.502 (2.79) (-1.64) (-2.10) (0.99) (1.50) 
Nasdaq 0.569*** -0.444*** -0.125 -0.339 -0.008 (3.21) (-5.12) (-0.83) (-0.65) (-0.03) 
We estimate cross sectional regressions for every month from July of 1985 to December of 2009, a total of 300 months. We then divide the sample up into three 
time period; the first time period covers years 1985-1992, the second 1993-2000, and the third 2001-2009. This regression is similar to the one in Table 2.4. We 
use NYSE as the base group. The coefficients can then be interpreted as the incremental effect of each explanatory variable on the Amex and Nasdaq exchanges 
as compared to the NYSE. Panel A show the results for the first time period, 1985-1992. Panel B shows the results for the second time period, 1993-2000, and 
Panel C shows the results for the last time period, 2001-2009. The standards errors are calculated as in Fama and MacBeth (1973), but corrected for serial 
correlation as in Newey and West (1987). Stars denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) respectively. 
                                                                              R, 	 a $ a Amex $ aNasdaq $ ∑ λ.,,9Q9*+ $ ∑ λ., ,9 bQ9*+ Amex $ ∑ λ., ,9Q9*+ b F
¨
> $ ε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 Table 2.6: Comparing prices of risk for firms with different characteristics 
PANEL A: Size 
    Beta_Mkt Beta_SMB Beta_HML Beta_UMD Beta_Liq LN(ME) LN(BE/ME) RET(-12,-2) AMIILL Adj R-Sq OBS 
Model 1 
Low 1.007*** 0.581*** -0.355*** 
4.60% 1033304 
(5.14) (4.46) (-2.93) 
Medium -0.523*** -0.491*** 0.413*** (-6.68) (-6.25) (5.40) 
High -0.745*** -0.543*** 0.481*** (-6.47) (-5.49) (4.96) 
Model 2 
Low 0.953*** 0.552*** -0.317*** -0.633*** 0.065 
5.30% 1033304 
(5.07) (4.35) (-2.70) (-5.11) (0.68) 
Medium -0.501*** -0.470*** 0.388*** -0.145* -0.490*** (-6.48) (-6.32) (5.43) (-1.85) (-6.19) 
High -0.725*** -0.514*** 0.456*** -0.089 -0.598*** (-6.25) (-5.44) (4.93) (-0.85) (-7.18) 
Model 3 
Low 0.829*** -1.745*** -0.522*** 
3.90% 969419 
(4.67) (-11.88) (-3.21) 
Medium -0.469*** 1.346*** 0.682*** (-5.33) (9.22) (7.87) 
High -0.643*** 1.662*** 0.632*** (-4.97) (10.43) (5.63) 
Model 4 
Low 0.611*** -2.286*** -0.405*** -7.612*** -1.044*** 
5.30% 904047 
(4.35) (-11.44) (-2.60) (-9.17) (-2.94) 
Medium -0.387*** 1.843*** 0.572*** 0.671*** 0.205 (-4.05) (10.38) (6.11) (3.61) (0.61) 
High -0.600*** 2.206*** 0.514*** 1.082*** 7.326 (-4.07) (11.01) (4.23) (3.88) (1.62) 
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Table 2.6 (cont.) 
PANEL B: B/M 
    Beta_Mkt Beta_SMB Beta_HML Beta_UMD Beta_Liq LN(ME) LN(BE/ME) RET(-12,-2) AMIILL Adj R-Sq OBS 
Model 1 
Low 0.378** 0.282** 0.052 
3.80% 1033304 
(2.34) (2.48) (0.48) 
Medium 0.060 0.116** -0.194*** (0.93) (2.16) (-3.59) 
High 0.228** 0.220*** -0.298*** (2.38) (2.94) (-3.64) 
Model 2 
Low 0.378** 0.265** 0.053 -0.023 0.019 
4.40% 1033304 
(2.36) (2.36) (0.49) (-0.21) (0.25) 
Medium 0.032 0.118** -0.164*** 0.145 -0.032 (0.50) (2.32) (-3.14) (1.55) (-0.37) 
High 0.178** 0.182** -0.231*** 0.187** 0.217** (2.00) (2.55) (-3.06) (2.15) (2.43) 
Model 3 
Low 0.219* -0.584*** -0.207 
3.30% 969419 
(1.74) (-7.48) (-1.20) 
Medium 0.204*** 0.101** 0.048 (3.10) (2.54) (0.29) 
High 0.423*** 0.018 0.955*** (3.81) (0.32) (4.00) 
Model 4 
Low 0.101 -0.488*** -0.212 -0.430 -0.400 
4.40% 904047 
(1.10) (-6.06) (-1.35) (-1.56) (-1.16) 
Medium 0.148** 0.054 0.054 0.220 -0.483*** (2.34) (1.46) (0.31) (1.28) (-4.46) 
High 0.372*** -0.024 0.962*** 0.093 -0.367*** (3.62) (-0.47) (4.18) (0.45) (-3.14) 
We estimate cross sectional regressions for every month from July of 1985 to December of 2009, a total of 300 months. This regression is similar to the one in 
Table 2.4, except that we sort all firms listed on the three exchanges into three groups based on characteristics and create dummies for the different groups. We 
then interact those dummies with the explanatory variables in the regression specification. We use group 0 (small firms or low book-to-market) as the base group. 
The coefficients can then be interpreted as the incremental effect of each explanatory variable in group 1 and group 2 (large firms or high book-to-market) as 
compared to the base group. The standards errors are calculated as in Fama and MacBeth (1973), but corrected for serial correlation as in Newey and West 
(1987). Stars denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) respectively. 
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Table 2.7: Comparing prices of risk across exchanges for firms less subject to arbitrage constraints 
PANEL A: Excluding smallest 10% of firms 
    Beta_Mkt Beta_SMB Beta_HML Beta_UMD Beta_Liq LN(ME) LN(BE/ME) RET(-12,-2) AMIILL Adj R-Sq OBS 
Model 1 
NYSE 0.335* 0.199** 0.157* 
4.30% 930109 
(1.88) (2.27) (1.76) 
Amex 0.169 0.018 -0.184 (1.04) (0.17) (-1.52) 
Nasdaq 0.151 0.024 -0.172** (1.53) (0.29) (-2.32) 
Model 2 
NYSE 0.294* 0.175** 0.192** 0.037 0.226*** 
5.00% 930109 
(1.67) (2.04) (2.09) (0.35) (2.63) 
Amex 0.216 0.056 -0.218* 0.073 0.095 (1.31) (0.50) (-1.76) (0.49) (0.76) 
Nasdaq 0.179* 0.042 -0.193** 0.004 0.170*** (1.81) (0.50) (-2.56) (0.05) (2.81) 
Model 3 
NYSE 0.330** -0.217*** 0.175** 
3.70% 880733 
(2.14) (-3.74) (2.10) 
Amex 0.087 -0.083 -0.307** (0.65) (-1.02) (-2.44) 
Nasdaq 0.029 -0.291*** -0.228* (0.32) (-5.27) (-1.91) 
Model 4 
NYSE 0.130 -0.183*** 0.154* -0.199 0.489*** 
5.00% 850849 
(1.28) (-3.07) (1.93) (-0.44) (2.86) 
Amex 0.238* -0.177** -0.249** 0.416 -0.758*** (1.72) (-2.08) (-1.99) (0.91) (-2.62) 
Nasdaq 0.114 -0.396*** -0.149 0.059 -0.654*** (1.32) (-6.53) (-1.39) (0.23) (-4.15) 
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Table 2.7 (cont.) 
PANEL B: Excluding 10% of firms with highest lagged IV 
    Beta_Mkt Beta_SMB Beta_HML Beta_UMD Beta_Liq LN(ME) LN(BE/ME) RET(-12,-2) AMIILL Adj R-Sq OBS 
Model 1 
NYSE 0.245 0.180** 0.145* 
4.00% 938375 
(1.48) (2.06) (1.65) 
Amex 0.273** 0.070 -0.087 (1.98) (0.73) (-0.82) 
Nasdaq 0.136 0.034 -0.149** (1.35) (0.38) (-2.09) 
Model 2 
NYSE 0.211 0.158* 0.177** 0.029 0.193** 
4.80% 938375 
(1.30) (1.83) (1.97) (0.28) (2.37) 
Amex 0.285* 0.079 -0.138 0.184 0.420*** (1.97) (0.83) (-1.27) (1.47) (3.83) 
Nasdaq 0.173* 0.049 -0.170** 0.112 0.310*** (1.72) (0.56) (-2.35) (1.44) (4.70) 
Model 3 
NYSE 0.259* -0.209*** 0.134 
3.60% 881448 
(1.83) (-3.83) (1.64) 
Amex 0.324*** -0.319*** -0.068 (2.61) (-4.83) (-0.57) 
Nasdaq 0.118 -0.337*** -0.229** (1.44) (-6.18) (-2.23) 
Model 4 
NYSE 0.072 -0.164*** 0.115 -0.053 0.538*** 
4.80% 816076 
(0.70) (-2.90) (1.44) (-0.12) (3.90) 
Amex 0.313** -0.171** -0.164 0.281 0.077 (2.21) (-2.25) (-1.30) (0.97) (0.46) 
Nasdaq 0.170* -0.419*** -0.158* 0.241 -0.492*** (1.87) (-7.94) (-1.66) (0.98) (-3.87) 
We estimate cross sectional regressions for every month from July of 1985 to December of 2009, a total of 300 months. This regression is similar to the one in 
the table (Table 2.4), except that we exclude the firms that should have the greatest arbitrage constraints. Panel A excludes the 10% of firms with the lowest MV 
in the prior month, and Panel B excludes the 10% of firms with the highest idiosyncratic volatility in the prior month. We use NYSE as the base group. The 
coefficients can then be interpreted as the incremental effect of each explanatory variable on the Amex and Nasdaq exchanges as compared to the NYSE.  
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Figure 1: Segmentation using non model-specific tests 
We estimate segmentation as in Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2011) and apply it to the domestic 
US markets. Explicitly, we model segmentation as 
jB¢, 	  ∑ N£,¤,|B¥,¤,  B¥¦,¤,|§¤*+  , 
where B¥,¤,  B¥,¤, is the difference in earnings yield (EY) between an industry (j) in a specific exchange 
(i) and that of the entire domestic market (w) in every year (t). The segmentation measure (SEG) is the 
industry weighted (IW) average of the absolute earnings yield differentials. Figure 1 illustrates how the 
average segmentation (for the three exchanges) has decreased over time for the three US exchanges 
(NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq).  
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Figure 2: Variation in the prices of systematic risk over time 
These graphs shows the prices of risk factors, as estimated monthly using cross sectional regressions of 
returns on the Fama and French (1993) firm factors loadings beta_mkt, beta_smb, and beta_hml (Model 1, 
Table 2.3) for the three domestic exchanges NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq over the period from January of 
1985 to December of 2009. The series have been smoothed using HP filters.  
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Figure 3: Variation in the differences of systematic risk prices over time 
These graphs shows the differences in the prices of risk for the three domestic exchanges over the period 
from January of 1985 to December of 2009. The series have been smoothed using HP filters. 
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